Oisin Deery
Assistant Professor
Email: deery@yorku.ca
Primary website: www.oisindeery.com
Secondary website: Google Scholar
I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at York University (on research leave of absence 2020-2023). I’m also a Lecturer and ARC DECRA Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.
My research and teaching interests lie at the intersection of philosophy of mind and action, artificial intelligence, metaphysics, and ethics.
In November 2019, I was awarded a DECRA (Discovery Early Career Researcher Award) by the Australian Research Council for a 3-year, full-time research project on agency and artificial intelligence, which I am pursuing at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.
Degrees
Ph.D., University of British ColumbiaM.A., University College Cork
B.A., National University of Ireland, Galway
Research Interests
Russell, Paul, & Deery, Oisín, Eds. (2013). The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín, Bedke, Matt, & Nichols, Shaun (2013). “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” in D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1 (pp. 126–150). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín, & Nahmias, Eddy (forthcoming). “The Experience of Free Will,” in J. Campbell (ed.), A Companion to Free Will. Wiley-Blackwell.
Deery, Oisín (2015). Review of D. Hodgson, Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2012), Mind, 124(493): 347–351.
Deery, Oisín (2013). Review of J. Alexander, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction (Polity, 2012), International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21(5): 787–791.
Deery, Oisín. (Forthcoming). Naturally Free Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín (2019). “Free Actions As a Natural Kind,” Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018.02068-7
Deery, Oisín & Nahmias, Eddy (2017). “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” Philosophical Studies, 174(5): 1255–1276.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 808–814.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?” Philosophical Explorations, 18(1): 2–19.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(2): 319–334.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 776–801.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will,” Philosophical Studies, 172(8): 2033–2054.
Deery, Oisín (2013). “Absences and Late Preemption,” Theoria, 79(4): 309–325.
Deery, Oisín (2007). “Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame,” Res Publica: A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy, 13(3): 209–230.
I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at York University (on research leave of absence 2020-2023). I’m also a Lecturer and ARC DECRA Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.
My research and teaching interests lie at the intersection of philosophy of mind and action, artificial intelligence, metaphysics, and ethics.
In November 2019, I was awarded a DECRA (Discovery Early Career Researcher Award) by the Australian Research Council for a 3-year, full-time research project on agency and artificial intelligence, which I am pursuing at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.
Degrees
Ph.D., University of British ColumbiaM.A., University College Cork
B.A., National University of Ireland, Galway
Research Interests
All Publications
Deery, Oisín, Bedke, Matt, & Nichols, Shaun (2013). “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” in D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1 (pp. 126–150). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín, & Nahmias, Eddy (forthcoming). “The Experience of Free Will,” in J. Campbell (ed.), A Companion to Free Will. Wiley-Blackwell.
Deery, Oisín (2015). Review of D. Hodgson, Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2012), Mind, 124(493): 347–351.
Deery, Oisín (2013). Review of J. Alexander, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction (Polity, 2012), International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21(5): 787–791.
Russell, Paul, & Deery, Oisín, Eds. (2013). The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín. (Forthcoming). Naturally Free Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín (2019). “Free Actions As a Natural Kind,” Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018.02068-7
Deery, Oisín & Nahmias, Eddy (2017). “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” Philosophical Studies, 174(5): 1255–1276.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 808–814.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?” Philosophical Explorations, 18(1): 2–19.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(2): 319–334.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 776–801.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will,” Philosophical Studies, 172(8): 2033–2054.
Deery, Oisín (2013). “Absences and Late Preemption,” Theoria, 79(4): 309–325.
Deery, Oisín (2007). “Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame,” Res Publica: A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy, 13(3): 209–230.
