Oisin Deery
Assistant Professor
Email: deery@yorku.ca
Primary website: www.oisindeery.com
Secondary website: Google Scholar
Media Requests Welcome
Accepting New Graduate Students
I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at York University.
My research interests lie at the intersection of philosophy of mind and action, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and ethics.
In my recently published monograph, Naturally Free Action (2021, Oxford University Press), I develop a naturalistic approach to free will, a.k.a. the ability to act freely.
I also work on issues (including ethical issues) related to artificial intelligence. In November 2019, I was awarded a DECRA (Discovery Early Career Researcher Award) by the Australian Research Council for a project on agency and artificial intelligence, which I pursued at Macquarie University from 2020-23.
Degrees
Ph.D., University of British ColumbiaM.A., University College Cork
B.A., National University of Ireland, Galway
Research Interests
Russell, Paul, & Deery, Oisín, Eds. (2013). The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín, Bedke, Matt, & Nichols, Shaun (2013). “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” in D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1 (pp. 126–150). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín, & Nahmias, Eddy (forthcoming). “The Experience of Free Will,” in J. Campbell (ed.), A Companion to Free Will. Wiley-Blackwell.
Deery, Oisín (2015). Review of D. Hodgson, Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2012), Mind, 124(493): 347–351.
Deery, Oisín (2013). Review of J. Alexander, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction (Polity, 2012), International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21(5): 787–791.
Deery, Oisín. (Forthcoming). Naturally Free Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín (2019). “Free Actions As a Natural Kind,” Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018.02068-7
Deery, Oisín & Nahmias, Eddy (2017). “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” Philosophical Studies, 174(5): 1255–1276.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 808–814.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?” Philosophical Explorations, 18(1): 2–19.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(2): 319–334.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 776–801.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will,” Philosophical Studies, 172(8): 2033–2054.
Deery, Oisín (2013). “Absences and Late Preemption,” Theoria, 79(4): 309–325.
Deery, Oisín (2007). “Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame,” Res Publica: A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy, 13(3): 209–230.
Current Courses
| Term | Course Number | Section | Title | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fall 2024 | GS/PHIL6390 3.0 | A | Philosophy of Action | SEMR |
| Fall 2024 | AP/PHIL2170 3.0 | A | Freedom, Determinism and Responsibility | LECT |
Upcoming Courses
| Term | Course Number | Section | Title | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winter 2025 | AP/MODR1770 6.0 | M | Techniques of Persuasion | LECT |
I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at York University.
My research interests lie at the intersection of philosophy of mind and action, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and ethics.
In my recently published monograph, Naturally Free Action (2021, Oxford University Press), I develop a naturalistic approach to free will, a.k.a. the ability to act freely.
I also work on issues (including ethical issues) related to artificial intelligence. In November 2019, I was awarded a DECRA (Discovery Early Career Researcher Award) by the Australian Research Council for a project on agency and artificial intelligence, which I pursued at Macquarie University from 2020-23.
Degrees
Ph.D., University of British ColumbiaM.A., University College Cork
B.A., National University of Ireland, Galway
Research Interests
All Publications
Deery, Oisín, Bedke, Matt, & Nichols, Shaun (2013). “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” in D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1 (pp. 126–150). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín, & Nahmias, Eddy (forthcoming). “The Experience of Free Will,” in J. Campbell (ed.), A Companion to Free Will. Wiley-Blackwell.
Deery, Oisín (2015). Review of D. Hodgson, Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2012), Mind, 124(493): 347–351.
Deery, Oisín (2013). Review of J. Alexander, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction (Polity, 2012), International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21(5): 787–791.
Russell, Paul, & Deery, Oisín, Eds. (2013). The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín. (Forthcoming). Naturally Free Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deery, Oisín (2019). “Free Actions As a Natural Kind,” Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018.02068-7
Deery, Oisín & Nahmias, Eddy (2017). “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” Philosophical Studies, 174(5): 1255–1276.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 808–814.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?” Philosophical Explorations, 18(1): 2–19.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(2): 319–334.
Deery, Oisín, Davis, Taylor, & Carey, Jasmine (2015). “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” Philosophical Psychology, 28(6): 776–801.
Deery, Oisín (2015). “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will,” Philosophical Studies, 172(8): 2033–2054.
Deery, Oisín (2013). “Absences and Late Preemption,” Theoria, 79(4): 309–325.
Deery, Oisín (2007). “Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame,” Res Publica: A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy, 13(3): 209–230.
Current Courses
| Term | Course Number | Section | Title | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fall 2024 | GS/PHIL6390 3.0 | A | Philosophy of Action | SEMR |
| Fall 2024 | AP/PHIL2170 3.0 | A | Freedom, Determinism and Responsibility | LECT |
Upcoming Courses
| Term | Course Number | Section | Title | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winter 2025 | AP/MODR1770 6.0 | M | Techniques of Persuasion | LECT |
