Publications: List: By School/Dept

Land Inequality and the Transition to Modern Growth
Review of Economic Dynamics , 4(2), 2008, 11(2), 257-282
Abstract: Can the initial distribution of land, in a country's early history, affect its subsequent economic development? In this paper, I show that when land ownership is sufficiently concentrated, the landed elite will lobby the government to raise barriers to industrialization in order to protect its rents in the rural economy. I develop a small open economy model in which barriers take the form of tariffs on the imports of intermediate inputs used in industry. Such tariffs can affect both the timing and the pace of industrialization. The quantitative application of the theory is motivated by an important question in economic history: why did Argentina not replicate Canadian economic success, despite reasonable expectations to the contrary in the late 19th century? I provide evidence that Argentina had a markedly higher inequality in land ownership than Canada. Taking as given the observed differences in land distributions in the early 20th century, the model produces differences in equilibrium tariffs similar to the ones observed at the time, and the ones required to account for the Canadian-Argentine income gap until 1950. Over time however, as land becomes unimportant in production, land inequality ceases to be a source of policy disparities and income gaps.

Self-Employment Rates and Business Sizes: The Role of Occupational Choice and Credit Market Frictions
(with Kartik Athreya)
Annals of Finance , 5, 295-519, 2009.
Abstract: Self-employment rates and project size vary greatly across countries. The main message of this paper is that these broad regularities are consistent with an environment in which a common self-employment technology is available worldwide, but where (a) financial intermediation costs and (b) alternatives in “paid” work differ greatly. Our model indicates that alternatives in paid work are crucial for explaining self-employment rates, whereas high financial intermediation costs primarily affect the scale of projects. We also show that credit use is not informative for predicting either rates of self-employment or the scale of self-employment projects.
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Risky Higher Education and Subsidies
(with Kartik Athreya)
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 29, 979-1023, 2005.
Abstract: Tertiary education in the U.S. requires large investments that are risky, lumpy, and well-timed. Tertiary education is also heavily subsidized. By making the risk of human capital investment more acceptable, especially to low wealth households, subsidies may increase investment in human capital, lower long-run inequality, and reduce aggregate precautionary savings. However, subsidies also encourage more poorly prepared students to attend and are usually financed via distortionary taxes. In this paper, we find that observed collegiate subsidies improve welfare substantially relative to the fully decentralized (zero subsidy) outcome. We show that subsidies help smooth consumption, lower skill premia, increase interest rates as precautionary savings fall, lower the inequality of both consumption and wealth, increase intergenerational income mobility and raise welfare, even when financed by distortionary taxes.
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Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy with Incomplete Markets and Idiosyncratic Risk
Journal of Monetary Economics , 51, 1245-1269, 2004.
Abstract: This study investigates an incomplete markets economy in which the saving behavior of a continuum of infinitely lived agents is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. Agents can use two types of assets (interest bearing IOUS and money) to smooth consumption. Money is valued because of a timing friction in the bond market. In particular, the bond market closes before agents observe their idiosyncratic productivity shock. I find that the Friedman rule is not optimal for this economy. The results indicate that the optimal allocation has a rate of inflation of 10%, and a positive amount of private credit held by the government. A positive inflation rate transfers resources from agents with big endowments to those holding bonds which improves risk sharing, and therefore, welfare. However, for higher rates of inflation, agents economize on money holdings, offsetting the insurance effects, and causing a reduction in welfare. Furthermore, higher rates of inflation discourage agents from borrowing, and the endogenous lower bound on bond holdings is higher than the exogenous borrowing limit. High rates of inflation, therefore, exacerbate frictions in the bond market.
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The Dynamic Interactions of Hate, Violence and Economic Well-Being

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Forthcoming.

Abstract: This paper provides a simple dynamic model that explores the interdependence and dynamic properties of hate, violence and economic well-being. It shows that a time-dependent economic growth process that affects the evolution of hate can yield a long-run steady state, but this steady state will not be free of hate and violence. Moreover, we show that better (long-run) economic conditions do not necessarily result in lower equilibrium levels of hate and violence. We also show that, under reasonable conditions, cycles of hate and violence cannot occur. Consequently, the dynamic properties of hate and violence alone cannot result in cyclical (net) economic well-being patterns. While stable and unstable equilibria are possible, the most likely equilibrium is a saddle point. Given its nature, we can view the paper as an example of a formal model for the ideas of the "dynamical system" literature in psychology. Although the paper does not discuss policy decisions, it identifies potential instruments for policymakers to achieve better steady states and greater stability.
Finally, we provide two fully nonlinear multi-dimensional numerical examples (in an appendix) to demonstrate the implications of various psychological attributes, sensitivity to economic conditions, externalities, violence and small equilibria perturbations regarding the nature of the steady state and stability of the equilibria.

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A Decision-Theoretic Method for Analyzing Crossing Survival Curves in Healthcare, Healthcare Analytics, December 2025
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Abstract:

The problem of crossing Kaplan-Meier curves has not been solved in the medical research literature to date. This paper integrates survival curve comparisons into decision theory, providing a theoretical framework and a solution to the problem of crossing Kaplan-Meier curves. The application of decision theory allows us to apply stochastic dominance concepts and risk preference attributes to compare treatments even when standard Kaplan-Meier curves cross. The paper shows that as additional risk preference attributes are adopted, Kaplan-Meier curves can be ranked under weaker restrictions, namely with higher orders of stochastic dominance. Consequently, even Kaplan-Meier curves that cross may be ranked. The method we present allows us to extract all possible information from survival functions; hence, superior treatments that cannot be identified using standard Kaplan-Meier curves may become identifiable. Our methodology is applied to two examples of published empirical medical studies. We show that treatments deemed non-comparable because their Kaplan-Meier curves intersect can be compared using our method.

Preferential Trade Agreements as Insurance

Journal of International Money and Finance, October 2024.

Abstract: We investigate preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation when risk-averse countries face demand uncertainty and, hence, have an insurance motive for pursuing trade integration. In this environment, when deciding which type of PTA - if any - they wish to form, countries seek to maximise their net welfare; that is, their expected utility less a risk premium. The desire for insurance influences not just whether a particular PTA forms but also the preferred depth of integration. We analyze the insurance implications of free trade agreements (FTAs), customs unions (CUs), and countries choosing to stand alone. We further distinguish between shallow CUs and deep CUs; in the former, members maximise the sum of their individual net welfares, while in the latter they maximise the net value of the sum of their individual expected welfares. We show that differences in country risk attitudes and the levels of risk they face, as well as the degree to which these risks are correlated, influence the formation and design of TAs. When countries' demands are uncorrelated, they form a deep CU if their levels of risk aversion are sufficiently different. If, however, their risk attitudes are similar, countries opt for shallower trade integration - either a shallow CU or a FTA - if they face low levels of uncertainty and choose to stand alone if one country faces a sufficiently high level of uncertainty. When countries' demands are correlated, they tend to form a deep CU if their demands are strongly negatively correlated, a FTA if their demands are strongly positively correlated and a shallow CU when their demands are weakly correlated. Intuitively, differences in country risk attitudes (i.e., their degree of risk aversion) act as an additional source of comparative advantage. Deeper integration - particularly via a CU - permits less risk-averse members to essentially export their relative partiality for risk to more risk-averse partners, thereby effectively providing the latter with insurance.

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Bonding by Guilt: A Resolution of the Finite Horizon Prisoners’ Dilemma

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2022

Abstract: This paper proposes an intuitive, guilt-based dynamic resolution of the prisoners’ dilemma with a finite horizon by viewing cooperation as generating a “stock of potential guilt” (SPG) that actuates upon defection, turning into realized guilt-cost. A player’s SPG is a state variable that increases with each cooperative interaction and moves according to a motion equation, converting the standard prisoners’ dilemma into one with a dynamic payoff matrix. We show that cooperation equilibria are possible for a wide range of parameter values within our guilt-based dynamic model, even if we do not exogenously assume that players necessarily cooperate in the first period of the game. We examine the likelihood of cooperation and find that higher guilt retention or discount factors, a longer time horizon, and greater SPG-responsiveness to cooperation in each period all increase the likelihood of equilibrium cooperation.

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Improving the efficacy of carbon tax policies

Journal of Government and Economics, 2021

Abstract: This paper examines the efficacy of carbon tax policies in view of the interactions between such policies and the firm’s carbon efficiency and financing decisions. We show that because the government, unlike capital markets, does not price its policy’s risk by taking into account default probabilities, the firm takes advantage of the government by using senior debt to minimize the carbon tax policy’s cost. The shift to debt financing, in turn, mitigates the carbon tax policy’s efficacy, resulting in lower carbon efficiency, thus higher carbon emissions. To remedy the government’s predicament, we propose a correct-pricing rule that mimics market equilibrium conditions, thereby forcing firms to consider government interests. Such a rule renders senior debt no longer useful for reducing the carbon tax policy’s cost. As a result, the tax policy’s efficacy increases, hence reducing carbon emissions. Finally, we briefly consider and comment on the case of a social-welfare maximizing government that strategically chooses its carbon tax.

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Firm boundaries and financing with opportunistic stakeholder behaviour

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2019

Abstract: We explore the impact of strategic behaviour of equity holders, debt holders and an opportunistic supplier of a critical input on the firm's capital structure, organizational design, and its outsourcing decision. We show that the supplier can trigger strategic bankruptcy even when the firm is solvent. Equity holders respond to this either by eliminating the supplier and producing the input in-house or by reducing their exposure to debt by using equity-financing. Both responses introduce inefficiency since in-house production costs of the input are higher, and debt is cheaper than equity. We show that the equilibrium debt-equity ratio varies positively with cash-flow profitability and the supplier's input marginal cost, but negatively with the riskiness of the cash flow and the equity holders' in-house input production costs.

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Are Customs Unions Really so Scarce?

Economic Record, 2018.

Abstract: We show that generalized customs unions (CUs), in which members choose different external tariff rates while still maximizing total member welfare, are always welfare-superior to both standard CUs with common external tariffs and free trade areas (FTAs). Since generalized CUs are indistinguishable to FTAs in practice, our analysis implies that observed TAs that have the appearance of FTAs may, in fact, be CUs. This possibility offers one potential explanation for the design of the WTO's rules on regional trade agreements, in particular the WTO's specification of a CET as the defining feature of a CU. Our results also suggest that empirical estimates of the different impacts of FTAs and CUs may be subject to a trade-agreements-misclassification bias.

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How Can Uncertainty Affect the Choice of Trade Agreements?

Economic Record, Volume 92, Issue 297, 2016

Abstract: This paper analyses how uncertainty influences the formation and design of regional trade agreements (TAs). Two sources of uncertainty – in demand and costs – are considered. Using a multi‐stage game, we show that, as long as some decisions are made after uncertainty is resolved, all TAs have option values. But, because TAs differ in their flexibility and degrees of coordination, these option values vary across TAs. Thus, under uncertainty, the usual cost–benefit analysis that underlies the formation and design of TAs is altered to reflect these option values. We also show that, due to the flexibility and coordination differences among TAs, their option values are affected differently by uncertainty. Consequently, the formation and design of TAs are also affected by the nature and degree of uncertainty. We demonstrate that the effects of an increase in uncertainty on the choice of TAs depend on the relative responsiveness of the TAs' option values with respect to the change in uncertainty, which in turn depend on the convexity properties of the countries' welfare functions under the different TAs. In particular, a TA whose option value is more responsive to a change in uncertainty becomes relatively more attractive when uncertainty increases. This enables us to predict which TAs are likely to emerge in an uncertain world. Using a specific example, we then show the effects of a change in both demand and cost uncertainty on the choice of TAs. We also examine the timing of the resolution of uncertainty and its effect on the choice of TAs and show that it can significantly impact the type of TA that countries wish to form.

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Union-firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency
Games and Economic Behavior , 2011, 71(2), pp.235-245
Abstract: This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union-firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.
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The Effects of Foreign Price Uncertainty on Australian Production and Trade, with Alan Woodland, Economic Record, 2010.

A New Methodology for Studying the Equity Premium, with P. Basu, Annals of Operations Research, 2010.

Extremism as a strategic tool in conflicts
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization , 2008, 68(2), 352-364
Abstract: This paper studies the strategic role of extremism within a two-country multi-stage game and shows that, in general, an equilibrium exists in which extremism is used by both rivals. We show that often changes in the environment affect the two countries differently. Specifically, as a country becomes wealthier, more powerful, or more democratic, its level of extremism decreases, but at the same time, its rival's level of extremism increases. Similarly, higher stakes in the conflict tend to increase the level of extremism in the relatively poorer, weaker, and less democratic country, but decrease the level of extremism in the other country. On the other hand, higher stakes in a conflict between similar countries and greater destructiveness vis-Ã -vis the contested asset will increase the levels of extremism in both countries. Since changes in the environment may affect the levels of extremism in the two countries in opposite ways, we calculate the probability of an extremist destructive episode as a possible measure of the "aggregate" level of extremism in the conflict. We find that the aggregate level of extremism decreases with wealth, power, and degree of democracy, but increases with the stakes in the conflict and with better access to destructive technology. Finally, we use the model to examine levels of extremism within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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Strategic Militancy and the Probability of Strikes in Union-Firm Bargaining, Labour Economics, 2008.

Political Extremism in the Presence of a Free Rider Problem, with E. Katz, Public Choice, 2007.

Measures of Risk Aversion and Comparative Statics of Industry Equilibrium
(with E. Katz)
American Economic Review , 9(1), 2006, pp.116-142
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A Framework for Empirical Applications of Production Theory without Expected Utility, Journal of Economics and Business, 2006.

Terms of Trade Uncertainty and the Distribution of Income, with U. Kohli, Review of International Economics, 1999.

Estimation Of Moments And Production Decisions Under Uncertainty
(with A. Ullah)
The Review of Economics and Statistics , 1997, 79(4), pp.631-637
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine production decisions under output price uncertainty. Using a nonparametric estimation technique to estimate the first four moments of the unknown price distribution and applying duality, we provide a simple empirical framework for the analysis of supply and demand decisions under price uncertainty. The model is used to examine the importance of higher moments in the firm's production decisions and to investigate underlying attitudes toward risk.
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Import Price Uncertainty And The Distribution Of Income
(with U. Kohli)
The Review of Economics and Statistics , 1997, 79(4), pp.620-630
Abstract: The effects of import-price uncertainty on factor income in Switzerland are estimated. The production-theory approach is used to derive the import demand function from an expected utility maximization problem, treating imports as an input to the technology. The model is also used to test for risk aversion and to assess the impact of uncertainty on the volume of imports and gross output. Evidence is found that, for most years. labor has been relatively more vulnerable to uncertainty than has capital.
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Corporate Taxation, Incumbency Advantage and Entry, with E. Katz, European Economic Review, 1996.

Equilibrium Entry Patterns under Uncertainty, with S. Weber, European Economic Review, 1994.

The Free Rider Problem in Oligopoly, with S. Weber, Economics Letters, 1993.

Government Policy and the Firm's Capital Structure, European Economic Review, 1993.

Bankruptcy, Warranties and the Firm's Capital Structure
International Economic Review , 1992, 33(2), pp.399-412.
Abstract: This paper examines the role of capital structure as an instrument for shifting risk between real and financial markets. The author considers a firm whose contractual agreements involve both consumers and debtholders and shows that if consumers are risk averse, whereas equity and debtholders are risk neutral, the firm uses its capital structure to shift risk away from consumers. The optimal allocation of risk across real and financial markets leads the firm to be fully equity financed.
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Demand conditions, regulation, and the measurement of productivity
(with J. Berechman)
Journal of Econometrics , 1991, 47(2-3), pp.379-400
Abstract: Most econometric studies of productivity use partial equilibrium analysis of cost models to estimate and measure productivity growth. In this paper we provide a market equilibrium model in which supply (cost), demand, and regulatory conditions are explicitly taken into account. The model is used to calculate the rate of growth in cost efficiency (productivity) in the Israeli bus transit sector and to explain this growth by the contributions of input prices, technical change, output scale, demand conditions, and government regulation.
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Uncertainty and the Measurement of Productivity, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 1991.

The Demand for Children in the Absence of Capital and Risk Markets: A Portfolio Approach, with E. Katz, Oxford Economic Papers, 1991.

Market Uncertainty and Competitive Equilibrium Entry", with C. Lim, European Economic Review, 1991.

Monopoly and Ex-post Contestable Markets”, with C. Lim, Australian Economic Papers, 128-140, 1990.

Portfolio Diversification and Taxation, with E. Katz, Economics Letters, 1988.

Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking
(with E. Katz)
Economic Journal , 1987, 97(387), pp.685-99
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking. Most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators. Regulators, howeve r, may also be expected (and indeed have been shown) to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are, themselves, rent se ekers. In this paper, the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators, firms, and consumers within a rent-s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self-motiva ted. The analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants. Policy implications are drawn where appropriate.
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Asymmetric Taxation and the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Uncertainty, with E. Katz, Canadian Journal of Economics, 1987.

Transfer Seeking and Avoidance: On the Full Social Costs of Rent Seeking, with E. Katz, Public Choice, 1986.

Rent Seeking and Entry, with E. Katz, Economics Letters, 1986.

Contestable Markets under Uncertainty
(with C. Lim)
Rand Journal of Economics , 1985, 16(1), pp.28-40
Abstract: In this article we present a model of a market which is ex post contestable. We show that in a market characterized by uncertainty a firm will face a tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility and generally will make some precommitments to take advantage of ex ante technologies. We show that in the face of potential entry the incumbent will increase his precommitments and in so doing will affect the probability of entry. The degree of market contestability is therefore endogenously determined by the choice of precommitments. The extent to which precommitments will be used to affect entry probabilities is shown to depend on the efficiency of ex ante production, adjustment costs, and the degree of uncertainty. In particular, we show that the market becomes "more contestable" as the relative efficiency of ex post production increases and as market conditions become more uncertain.
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The Effects of Precision of Sentencing Information on Crime Rates, with E. Erez, Journal of Criminal Justice, 1983.

The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power
Journal of Econometrics , 1982, 19(2-3), pp.287-299.
Abstract: This paper extends the use of econometric production theory techniques to ageneral class of oligopolistic markets. We provide a framework which enables us to estimate the conjectural variation and test various hypotheses about non-competitive behavior. Furthermore, we provide a measure of the degree of oligopolistic power of a firm and a degree of oligopoly index for the whole industry that can be used to test for the underlying structure of the industry.
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Long Run Industry Equilibrium with Uncertainty, with C. Lim, Economics Letters, 1982.

Monopoly vs. Competition under Uncertainty, with C. Lim, Canadian Journal of Economics, 1982.

Market Constraints as a Rationale for the Friedman-Savage Utility Function
(with E. Katz)
Journal of Political Economy , 1981, 89(4), pp.819-25
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On the Choice of Functional Forms
International Economic Review , 1979, 20(2), pp.449-58.
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Testing price taking behavior
Journal of Econometrics , 1979, 9(3), pp.283-294.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present an empirically implementable technique for the analysis of non-competitive behavior in production. We provide a statistical test for the price taking behavior hypothesis which can be used to distinguish among different market structures. We apply this approach to the U.S. crude petroleum and natural gas industry and find that the price taking behavior hypothesis is not appropriate for this industry.
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Canada U.S. Trade: Tests for the Small Open Economy Hypothesis, Canadian Journal of Economics, with U. Kohli, 1979.

Optimal Capital Policy with Bounded Investment Plans
(with R. Harris)
International Economic Review , 1978, 19(1), pp.103-14
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Imperfect Capital Markets and Life Cycle Saving, with R. Harris, Canadian Journal of Economics, 1978.

Testing Neoclassical Production Theory, Journal of Econometrics, 1978.

Estimating Technology in an Intertemporal Framework: A Neo Austrian Approach, with R. Harris, Review of Economics and Statistics, 1977.

Duality in Optimal Growth, International Economic Review, 1975.

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Mary Wiktorowicz, Kaitlin Di Pierdomenico, Neil J. Buckley, Steve Lurie and Gail Czukar, (2020). Governance of Mental Healthcare: Fragmented Accountability, Social Science and Medicine, 256.

Neil J. Buckley, Stuart Mestelman, R. Andrew Muller, Stephan Schott and JingJing Zhang, (2018). The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons, Environmental and Resource Economics, 70(2), 363-380.

Neil J Buckley, Kate Cuff , Jerry Hurley, Stuart Mestelman, Stephanie Thomas and David Cameron, (2018) A Behavioral Economic Study of Tax Rate Selection by the Median Voter: Can the Tax Rate Be Influenced by the Name of the Publicly Provided Private Good? Theoretical Economics Letters, 8, 485-501.

Neil Buckley, Stuart Mestelman, R. Andrew Muller, Mackenzie Rogers, Stephan Schott and Jingjing Zhang, "Appropriation from a Common Pool Resource: Effects of the Characteristics of the Common Pool Resource, the Appropriators and the Existence of Communication", in Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, Chapter 2, 2016, Anabela Botelho, Editor, The WSPC Reference of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy in the Era of Global Change, Ariel Dinar, Editor-in-Chief, World Scientific Publishing Company, pp. 15-42.

Neil J Buckley, Kate Cuff , Jerry Hurley, Stuart Mestelman, Stephanie Thomas and David Cameron, (2016). Should I Stay or Should I Go? Exit Options withing Mixed Systems of Public and Private Health Care Finance, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 131B, 62-77.

Neil J Buckley, Kate Cuff , Jerry Hurley, Stuart Mestelman, Stephanie Thomas and David Cameron, (2015). Support for Public Provision of a Private Good with Top-Up and Opt-Out: A Controlled Laboratory Experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 111, 177-196.

Neil J Buckley, Kate Cuff , Jerry Hurley, Logan McLeod, Robert Nuscheler, and David Cameron, (2012). Willingness-to-Pay for Parallel Private Health Insurance: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment, Canadian Journal of Economics 45(1), 137-166.

Neil J Buckley, Kate Cuff , Jerry Hurley, Logan McLeod, Stuart Mestelman, and David Cameron, (2012). An Experimental Investigation of Mixed Systems of Public and Private Health Care Finance, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 84(3), 713-729.

Jerry Hurley, Neil J Buckley, Kate Cuff, Mita Giacomini and David Cameron, (2011). Judgments Regarding the Fair Division of Goods: The Impact of Verbal versus Quantitative Descriptions of Alternative Divisions, Social Choice and Welfare 37(2), 341-372.

Neil J. Buckley, Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller. (2008) . Baseline-and-Credit Emission Permit Trading: Experimental Evidence Under Variable Output Capacity, in Experimental Methods in Environmental Economics, Todd Cherry, Stephan Kroll and Jason Shogren (eds.), New York: Routledge Press.

S. Schott, N.J. Buckley, S. Mestelman, and R.A. Muller. (2007) . Output Sharing in Partnerships as a Common Pool Resource Management Instrument. Environmental and Resource Economics, 37(4), pp.697-711.

Buckley, N.J., Mestelman, S. and R.A. Muller. (2006) . Implications of Alternative Emission Trading Plans: Experimental Evidence. Pacific Economic Review, 11(2), pp.149-166.

Buckley, N.J., Denton, F.T., Robb, A.L. and B. G. Spencer. (2006) . Socioeconomic Influence on the Health of Older People: Estimates Based on Two Longitudinal Surveys. Canadian Public Policy, 32(1), pp.59-83.

Chowhan, J. and N.J. Buckley. (2005) . Using Mean Bootstrap Weights in Stata: A BSWREG Revision. The Research Data Centres Information and Technical Bulletin 2(1), 23-37

Buckley, N.J., Denton, F.T., Robb, A.L. and B.G. Spencer. (2004) . Healthy Aging at Older Ages: Are Income and Education Important? Canadian Journal on Aging, 23(S1), S155-S169.

Buckley, N.J., Denton, F.T., Robb, A.L. and B.G. Spencer. (2004) . The Transition from Good to Poor Health: An Econometric Study of the Older Population. Journal of Health Economics, 23(5), pp.1013-1034.

E. Piérard, N. J. Buckley, and J. Chowhan. (2004) . Bootstrapping Made Easy: A Stata ADO File. The Research Data Centres Information and Technical Bulletin 1(1), 20-36.

Buckley, N.J. Mestelman, S. and M. Shehata. (2003) . Subsidizing Public Inputs. Journal of Public Economics, 87(3-4), pp.819-846.

Neil Buckley., Kenneth S. Chan, James Chowhan, Stuart Mestelman and Mohamed Shehata. (2001) . Value Orientations, Income and Displacement Effects, and Voluntary Contributions. Experimental Economics, 4(2), pp.183-195.

Health, Health Insurance, and Inequality
with Zhigang Feng and Jiaying Gu
International Economic Review, February 2025, Vol. 66(1): 107-141.

Land Security and Mobility Frictions
with Tasso Adamopoulos, Loren Brandt, Diego Restuccia, and Xiaoyun Wei
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2024, Vol. 139(3): 1941-1987.

Family Migration and Structural Transformation
with Huoqing Cao, Xican Xi, and Sharon Xuejing Zuo
Canadian Journal of Economics, August 2024, Vol. 57(3): 753-776.

Land Misallocation and Productivity
with Diego Restuccia and Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 15(2): 441-65.

Finance, Managerial Inputs, and Misallocation
with Ashique Habib and Xiaodong Zhu
American Economic Review: Insights, September 2023, Vol. 5(3): 409-26.

The Effects of Land Markets on Resource Allocation and Agricultural Productivity
with Diego Restuccia and Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis
Review of Economic Dynamics, 45: 41-54.

Technology Adoption, Capital Deepening, and International Productivity Differences
Journal of Development Economics, 143: 102388

Capital-Skill Complementarity, Sectoral Labor Productivity, and Structural Transformation
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 116: 103902.

Untitled Land, Occupational Choice, and Agricultural Productivity
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(4): 91-121

"Rising Concentration and Wage Inequality" with Jeanne Tschopp, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, April 2024, Vol. 126, Issue 2: 320-354.

“Heterogeneous Labor Market Impacts of the Covid-19 Pandemic”, with Eliza Forsythe. ILR Review, January 2023, Vol. 76, Issue 1: 30-55.

“Distributional Impacts of the Covid-19 Pandemic and the CARES Act”, with Eliza Forsythe. Journal of Economic Inequality, 2023, Vol. 21: 325-349.

"The Growing Importance of Social Tasks in High-Paying Occupations: Implications for Sorting" with Nir Jaimovich and Henry E. Siu, Journal of Human Resources, September 2023, Vol. 58, Issue 5: 1429-1451.

"Make Your Own Luck: The Wage Gains from Starting College in a Bad Economy" with Alena Bičáková and Jacopo Mazza, Labour Economics, October 2023, Vol. 84, Article 102411.

“Caught in the Cycle: Economic Conditions at Enrolment and Labour Market Outcomes of College Graduates”, with Alena Bicakova and Jacopo Mazza. The Economic Journal, August 2021, Vol. 131, Issue 638: 2383-2412.

“Between-Group Inequality May Decline Despite a Rising Skill Premium”, with Imran Aziz. Labour Economics, October 2021, Vol. 72, Article 102063.

“The Dynamics of Disappearing Routine Jobs: A Flows Approach”, with Nir Jaimovich, Christopher J. Nekarda and Henry E. Siu. Labour Economics, Special Issue on Technology and the Labour Market, August 2020, Vol.65, Article 101823.

“Do Technological Advances Reduce the Gender Wage Gap?”, with Ana Oliveira and Anna Salomons. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Winter 2020, Vol. 36, Issue 4: 903-924.

"Delving into the Demand Side: Changes in Workplace Specialization and Job Polarization" with Andrea Salvatori. Labour Economics, April 2019, Vol. 57: 164-176.

“The Individual-Level Patterns Underlying the Decline of Routine Jobs”, Travail et Emploi, Special Issue on Polarization(s) in Labor Markets, 2019, Vol. 157: 45-66.

"The Costs of Occupational Mobility: An Aggregate Analysis" with Giovanni Gallipoli. Journal of the European Economic Association, April 2018, Vol.16, No.2: 275-315.

"Disappearing Routine Jobs: Who, How, and Why”, with Nir Jaimovich and Henry E. Siu, Journal of Monetary Economics, November 2017, Vol.91: 69-87.

"Where Have the Middle-Wage Workers Gone? A Study of Polarization using Panel Data". Journal of Labor Economics, January 2016, Vol. 34, No.1: 63-105.

Politicians' Luck of the Draw: Evidence from the Spanish Christmas Lottery
(with Manuel Bagues)
Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 124(5), 2016, pp. 1269-94
Abstract: Incumbent politicians tend to receive more votes when economic conditions are good. In this paper we explore the source of this correlation, exploiting the ex- ceptional evidence provided by the Spanish Christmas Lottery. Because winning tickets are typically sold by one lottery outlet, winners tend to be geographi- cally clustered. This allows us to study the impact of exogenous good economic conditions on voting behavior. We find that incumbents receive significantly more votes in winning provinces. The evidence is consistent with a temporary increase in happiness making voters more lenient toward the incumbent, or with a stronger preference for the status quo.
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Are Women Pawns in the Political Game? Evidence from Elections to the Spanish Senate
(with Manuel Bagues)
Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 96(3-4), 2012, pp. 387-99
Abstract: This paper investigates the reasons behind the low representation of women among legislators. Using data from Spain, we find that parties tend to nominate female candidates to poorer positions on the ballot. We examine whether this is due to voter bias or party bias, and find two pieces of evidence supporting the latter: female candidates attract more votes, and political competition improves the quality of positions to which female candidates are assigned. Moreover, gender quotas fail to erode the strategic nomination of female candidates. The evidence in this paper helps explain why quotas in candidate lists might often lead to disappointing increases in the number of elected female politicians.
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Voter Turnout and Electoral Competition in a Multidimensional Policy Space
(with Rafael Hortala-Vallve)
European Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 27(2), 2011, pp. 376-84
Abstract: We analyze the interaction between electoral competition and voters' decision to vote. We show that when voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, politicians offer differentiated policies to motivate citizens to vote. In particular, politicians adapt their policies to the most sensitive voters—thus less sensitive voters abstain on the grounds of perceiving politicians as being too similar. In a multidimensional policy space, this implies that citizens who only care about a few issues do not vote.
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Voter Turnout in a Multidimensional Policy Space

(with Rafael Hortala-Vallve)
Economics of Governance

, Vol. 12, 2011, pp. 25-49.
Abstract:

Many factors influence the likelihood of citizens turning out to vote. In this paper we focus our attention on issue voting, that is, on the likelihood that different policies offered by politicians affect the probability of voting. If voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, rational voters will only vote when politicians offer differentiated policies. In a multidimensional policy space this implies that citizens only vote when they perceive enough difference on the issues they care about the most. We investigate the role of voter abstention due to indifference in a unidimensional and a multidimensional policy setting using data from the US National Election Studies for 1972–2000 and find support for our predictions: voters perceiving a small difference between the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties are less likely to vote; and voters who perceive the two parties as more different on a larger number of issues are significantly more likely to vote.

Can Gender Parity Break the Glass Ceiling? Evidence from a Repeated Randomized Experiment
(with Manuel Bagues)
Review of Economic Studies , Vol. 77(4), 2010, pp. 1301-28
Abstract: This paper studies whether the gender composition of recruiting committees matters. We make use of the unique evidence provided by Spanish public examinations, where the allocation of candidates to evaluating committees is random. We analyse how the chances of success of 150,000 female and male candidates for positions in the four main Corps of the Spanish Judiciary from 1987 to 2007 were affected by the gender composition of their evaluation committee. We find that a female (male) candidate is significantly less likely to be hired whenever she (he) is randomly assigned to a committee where the share of female (male) evaluators is relatively greater. Evidence from multiple choice tests suggests that this is due to the fact that female majority committees overestimate the quality of male candidates.
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“Academic Citizenship: An Academic Colleagues’ Working Paper,” Journal of Academic Ethics, Vol. 3 Nos. 2-4, Dec. 2005, 127-142, (with Paul Thompson and Philippe Constantineau).

"Rent Control: The Citizen, The Market and The State," Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 1988, 1, 309-320. Also in R.J. Arnott and J.M. Mintz, eds. Rent Control: The International Experience. Kingston, Ontario: The John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, 1989.

"Housing Allowances, Nonprofit Housing, and Cost-Effective Program Choice," Journal of Housing Economics, 1995, 4, 1-17 (with A.J. Hosios and G.V. Jump).

"On Choosing Social Policy instruments: The Case of Non-Profit Housing, Housing Allowances or Income Assistance," Progress in Planning, 1993, 40, Part 1, 1-88.

"Housing Finance and Housing Subsidies in Canada," Urban Studies, 1990, 27, 877-903. Reprinted in G. Arbuckle and H. Bartel, eds., Readings in Canadian Real Estate, Third edition. Toronto: Captus University Publications, 1996.

"The Optimal Design of Housing Allowances," Journal of Urban Economics, 1990, 27, 381-397.

"Stage Two Tax Reform and Housing," Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 1988, 26, 603-628.

"Recent Developments in Economic Models of Housing Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, 1988, 26, 28-64, (with L.B. Smith and K.T. Rosen).

"Rent Control in Toronto: Tenant Rationing and Tenant Benefits," Canadian Public Policy, 1985, 11, 543-550, (with L.B. Smith).

"Price Effects of Rent Control on Controlled and Uncontrolled Rental Housing in Toronto: A Hedonic Index Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, 1985, 18, 652-59, (with L.B. Smith).

"Uncontrolled Prices in a Controlled Market: The Case of Rent Controls," American Economic Review, 1984, 74, 193-200, (with L.B. Smith). Reprinted in John M. Quigley, ed., The Economics of Housing Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

"Housing Tenure in a Model of Consumer Choice: A Simple Diagrammatic Analysis," American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Journal, 1983, 11, 30-44.

"Factor Substitution, Employment Density and Suburbanization," Journal of Urban Economics, 1979, 6, 156-175.

“The University as an Institution of Democracy,” Journal of the World Universities Forum, Vol. 1, No. 6, 107-114.

Pollution Havens, Endogenous Environmental Policy, and Foreign Direct Investment
(with P. Missios and H.M. Yildiz)
Southern Economic Journal, 82(1), July 2015, 257-284
Abstract: In an increasingly integrated world economy, countries may have greater incentives to weaken environmental policy as disguised protection intended to give a competitive edge to local firms. This may generate pollution havens as firms relocate in response to different environmental policies. Foreign direct investment (FDI) weakens profit-shifting policy considerations while increasing environmental damages but, at the same time, may provide external benefits. We derive conditions under which the FDI-recipient country has an incentive to manipulate its environmental standard to prevent or attract FDI, potentially eliminating or creating pollution havens, in addition to examining the impact of FDI on the equilibrium state of the environment.
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Inter-regional Competition, Comparative Advantage, and Environmental Federalism
(with P. Missios and H.M. Yildiz)
Canadian Journal of Economics, 47(3), August 2014, 905-952
Abstract: In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in different polluting goods. We develop a two-region, two-good model with inter-regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions, the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes, depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution. This suggests that federalism can lead to either a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top," without relying on inefficient lobbying efforts or capital competition.
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Pricing of Drugs with Heterogeneous Health Insurance Coverage
(with P. Missios)
Journal of Health Economics, 31(2), March 2012, 440-456
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the role of insurance coverage in explaining the generic competition paradox in a two-stage game involving a single producer of brand-name drugs and n quantity-competing producers of generic drugs. Independently of brand loyalty, which some studies rely upon to explain the paradox, we show that heterogeneity in insurance coverage may result in higher prices of brand-name drugs following generic entry. With market segmentation based on insurance coverage present in both the pre- and post-entry stages, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs are highly substitutable and the market is quite profitable but does not have to arise when the two types of drugs are highly differentiated. However, with market segmentation occurring only after generic entry, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs are weakly substitutable, provided, however, that the industry is not very profitable. In both cases, that is, when market segmentation is present in the pre-entry stage and when it is not, the paradox becomes more likely to arise as the market expands and/or insurance companies decrease deductibles applied on the purchase of generic drugs.
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A Cross-Country Study of Household Waste Prevention and Recycling: Assessing the Effectiveness of Policy Instruments
(with P. Missios)
Land Economics, 88(4), November 2012, 710-744
Abstract: With worldwide concern for how and where to dispose of household waste, policy makers are increasingly looking for tools to efficiently and effectively reduce the amount of waste households produce. Using a comprehensive household-level data set involving 10,251 respondents from a cross section of 10 countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), we examine waste policy, recycling behavior, and waste prevention. Unlike previous work, we empirically make comparisons across countries, incorporate attitudinal characteristics and a wide range of policy instruments, and allow for interdependence of decisions about recycling different materials.
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Illegal Disposal and Waste Collection Frequency
Pacific Economic Review, 16(2), 2011, 255-266
Abstract: A model of household refuse production is presented in which the implications of the presence of dumping incentives for the public choice of garbage collection frequency under a user fee system are analysed. Insofar as governments wishing to balance their waste collection service budgets can set the marginal benefit of collecting garbage equal to its marginal cost, no externality arises through pick-up frequency. However, when the expected punishment for dumping is zero or independent of its extent, the public provision of refuse collection frequency turns out to be negatively affected by the amount of garbage that individuals dump and, therefore, intervention in the management of household waste is required. The optimal policy is found to consist of taxes on consumption goods and subsidies for curbside (or legal) disposal and recycling that are directly linked to collection costs.
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Trading Rules and the Environment: Does Equal Treatment Lead to a Cleaner World?
(with P. Missios and H.M. Yildiz)
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 58(2), September 2009, 206-225
Abstract: In this paper, we consider a three-stage game in the context of a competing exporters model to compare and contrast the effects of discriminatory and uniform (Most Favored Nation, MFN) tariffs on countries' choice over environmental standards for varying degrees of pollution spillovers. Because of the presence of punishment effects and stronger own and cross-tariff effects, we find that discrimination yields higher standards than MFN (and free trade) independently of the extent of pollution spillovers. When pollution is local and incentives to free ride on other countries' abatement efforts are weak, we show, however, that welfare is larger under MFN than under discrimination. In a dynamic setting, we consider the impact of symmetric and asymmetric treatments on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) and obtain that multilateral cooperation is easier to sustain under discrimination than under MFN (or free trade).
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Can Health Insurance Coverage Explain the Generic Competition Paradox?
(with Y. Kong)
Economics Letters, 101, 2008, 48-52
Abstract: In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.
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Illegal Disposal of Commercial Solid Waste: A Dynamic Analysis
Atlantic Economic Journal, 36(2), June 2008, 211-232
Abstract: This paper is concerned with the waste stock externality associated with production decisions when garbage collection services are financed by means of user charges and illegal disposal is a viable option to firms. As waste accumulates over time, providing disutility not only to present generations but also to future generations by negatively affecting environmental quality, the private and social production choices are compared in the context of a dynamic (intertemporal) model. The inclusion of the dynamics of the waste stock, which translates into a function describing how the deterioration of environmental quality over time is linked to waste production as well as disposal mix (recycling, curbside disposal, and illegal disposal), enables the design of dynamic Pareto-efficient incentive mechanisms for optimal waste production and management.
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Local Willingness-to-Pay Estimates for the Remediation of the Sydney Tar Ponds in Nova Scotia
(with S. McComb and P. Missios)
Canadian Public Policy, 33(4), 2007, 441-458
Abstract: The Sydney Tar Ponds and Coke Ovens site in Nova Scotia, Canada, is among the most toxic hazardous waste sites in North America. This study presents hedonic estimates of the willingness-to-pay for remediation of the site using housing sales data from urban Sydney. Negative impacts are estimated with a maximum likelihood spatial autoregressive model of property values. Premiums on homes farther from the site are found to be substantial, and, when aggregated into a community willingness-to-pay measure ($169.2 million), cover a large proportion of the estimated remediation costs.
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Automobile Quality Choice under Pollution Control Regulation
Environmental and Resource Economics, 38(3), November 2007, 353-372
Abstract: In this paper, we develop a modified quality choice model to study the effects of various mobile-source air pollution control regulations. We have a single producer that supplies a fixed number of car types (two) but faces a spectrum of consumers differing in their valuation of car quality. The car manufacturer chooses the quality levels of the two car types as well as the sales mix between the two types and the size of the market it wishes to supply. By endogenizing both the sales mix and the market size, while still allowing quality to be a choice variable, we are able to more completely analyze the impact of any car pollution control regulation. Existing studies of this impact either focus on the model line adjustment response (shifts in the quality array) or on the price adjustment response (changes in the sales mix and market size). In allowing for both the model line and the price adjustment options, we find that the corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standard is unambiguously welfare superior to the low-emission vehicle quantity constraint (LEV) and zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) programs. We also show that the effects of the CAFE standard are not equivalent to those of a fuel tax, as previously found, and that, for a given car pollution target, the former is preferred to the latter.
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Recycling and Waste Diversion Effectiveness: Evidence from Canada
(with P. Missios)
Environmental and Resource Economics, 30(2), February 2005, 221-238
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the relationship between recycling policy options and recycling behavior to study the most effective methods of diverting post-consumer waste from landfills. We employ data from a unique, micro-data set collected from households in communities across Ontario, Canada. We estimate the relationships between several commonly recycled materials (newsprint, glass, plastics, aluminum cans, tin cans, cardboard, and toxic chemicals) and individual household characteristics, recycling program attributes, and garbage collection financing methods. We find that user fees on garbage collection have significant impacts on recycling levels for all materials except toxic chemicals, and mandatory recycling programs on particular items have significant effects on recycling for almost all materials. Limits on the amount of garbage that can be placed at the curb, and providing free units under user fee systems, however, generally have a negligible or detrimental impact on recycling.
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Refillable versus Non-Refillable Containers: The Impact of Regulatory Measures on Packaging Mix and Quality Choices
(with C. Plourde)
Resources Policy, 29, 2003, 1-13
Abstract: With the continually declining percentage of soft drink sales in refillable bottles in favour of cans and PET bottles, despite a growing soft drink market, governments have become increasingly concerned about the alleged more environmentally harmful impacts of throw-away convenience packaging and tried to enact policies to induce consumers to switch to refillable glass bottles. In many cases, fully or partially refundable deposits have been opted for to provide consumers with the incentive to properly dispose of packaging, but not to switch between different container types, and thus, they may not constitute the most desirable solution. The effects of various regulatory measures on produceers' choices of packaging quality and mix in the presence of consumers with differing demand intensities are therefore analyzed to discern the least distortionary alternative.
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Differential Provision of Solid Waste Collection Services in the Presence of Heterogeneous Households
Environmental and Resource Economics, 26(2), October 2003, 211-226
Abstract: A model of household refuse production is presented in which individuals differ in their distaste for the waste stock and the supply of waste collection services is continuous in pick-up frequency. The inclusion of pick-up frequency into household solid waste management analyses has already been shown to have policy implications. In fact, even in the absence of the waste stock externality, a system of uniform consumption taxes and legal (or curbside) disposal and recycling subsidies has been found to be necessary (and sufficient) to induce households to socially optimally allocate their resources when illegal disposal (or simply dumping) incentives exist but a per unit punishment system for dumping is lacking. This policy is here concluded to be no longer feasible; instead, a system of differential consumption taxes and recycling subsidies and uniform legal disposal subsidies is found to be optimal (but possibly nonimplementable). In the presence of heterogeneous households, which are however identifiable on the basis of their relative location to the landfill site, an optimal and implementable policy is then shown to require a differential provision of collection services.
[go to paper]

Effective Speed Enforcement and Photo Radar: Evidence from Australia
(with P. Missios)
International Journal of Transport Economics, 28(3), October 2001, 373-385
Abstract: Photo radar, or an automatic camera-equipped traffic monitoring device, is designed to reduce speeding by increasing the likelihood of catching drivers going over a predetermined speed limit. However, it can be limited in certain circumstances by the inability to identify the driver. This paper examines the effectiveness of photo radar in reducing road fatalities and collisions. A simplified driver-choice model is provided to demonstrate the effects of photo radar on speeding when the driver can be identified and demerit points given, and when the vehicle owner is given a monetary fine alone. Empirical analysis using raw data from Victoria, Australia, and controlling for other factors such as weather conditions and drunk driving, suggests that photo radar reduces traffic fatalities, injuries and collisions in the situation where demerit points are applied to speeding offences.
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Non-Use Values and the Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources
(with P. Missios)
Ecological Economics, 25, 1998, 281-289
Abstract: It has long been recognized in economics that individuals can derive benefits from a resource stock without directly or indirectly utilizing that resource. Such non-use values, including existence values and bequest values, are often ignored in models of resource management. In this paper, a simple, two-country model of the management of a renewable resource is developed in which at least one country has a non-economic interest in the conservation of the fish stock to examine the impact of such a non-use value on the end-of-period harvest and self-enforcing sharing rule. The model shows that this non-lucrative pursuit serves to decrease the total allowable catch for each period at the expense of the catch share of the more conservation-oriented country, a result that is consistent with the September 1995 decision by NAFO ending the dispute between Canada and the EU over turbot.
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Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
(with P. Missios)
Marine Resource Economics, 11(4), Fall 1996, 239-245
Abstract: Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with, and provide insights into, the particulars of recent disputes.
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“Measuring Regional Effects of Monetary Policy in Canada”, Applied Economics July 2009, Vol. 41, Issue 16, p2093-2113.

“The Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle Revisited: Is the home-bias much less?”, with Walid Hejazi, in the International Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 18, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 341-350
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“Financial Structure and the Heterogeneous Impact of Monetary Policy across Industries”, with Walid Hejazi, Journal of Economics and Business, lead article, Vol. 61, Issue 1, p1-33, Jan/Feb. 2009
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“Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions: Does the Exchange Rate Matter?”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 2008, vol. 41 (2), May 2008
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“The J- Curve Revisited: An Empirical Examination for Canada”, Atlantic Economic Journal, July vol. 36, p315-332, July 2008

“What drives Provincial – Canada Yield Spreads?”, with Laurence Booth and Walid Hejazi, Canadian Journal of Economics, 2007, Vol. 40 (3), 1008-1032.
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“Estimating the Demand for Money in Canada: Does including an own rate of return matter?”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2006, Vol. 46 (4), 513-529.
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“Feldstein-Horioka Meets a Time Trend”, with Walid Hejazi , 2005, Economics Letters, 86, 353-357.

“What are the Determinants of Long-Term Nominal Interest Rates?”, Canadian Economics Association meetings, Toronto, Ontario, June 2004

International Outsourcing, Exchange Rates, and Monetary Policy
Journal of Interational Money and Finance , 118, 2021, 102461
Abstract: Firms’ decisions to outsource the production of intermediate inputs abroad depend on the macroeconomic environment set by governments’ monetary and foreign exchange policies, while the relocations of production change liquidity demands in the financial markets and affect policy effectiveness. This paper studies theoretically the interdependence of firms’ sourcing decisions and governments’ conducts of policies. By constructing a two-country, monetary model with segmented financial markets to incorporate the microeconomic foundations of firms’ make-or-buy decisions and highlight the working capital needs of both buyers and suppliers of intermediate inputs, the endogenous adjustments of international outsourcing at both the extensive and intensive margins are examined. It shows that the adjustments at the intensive margin of firms’ sourcing decisions will dampen the effects of temporary monetary shocks under a fixed exchange rate if the firms face low upfront payments to their foreign suppliers. The adjustments at the extensive margin can alter qualitatively the impacts of a currency revaluation and help explain the perverse effect on the trade balance. Implementing the Friedman rule and a fixed exchange rate regime can address both margins so that the socially optimal allocation can be achieved.
[go to paper]

Liquidity Constraints, International Trade, and Optimal Monetary Policy”
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics , 20(1), 2020, 20150203
Abstract: The availability of liquidity matters for an economy’s production and trade as firms need working capital to finance their operations. This paper studies the interaction between trade and capital flows operating through the liquidity allocations in the financial markets using a small-open-economy, overlapping-generations model. Working capital requirements distort the intratemporal consumption allocations. International capital inflows help easing liquidity in the domestic credit market, facilitating trade and improving the intratemporal allocation, while distorting the intertemporal allocation of the economy. We show how the government can use the Friedman rule and differentiated consumption taxes to address the tradeoff between the intratemporal and intertemporal distortions and achieve the second best optimum. Imposing a higher tax rate on imports can reduce the international borrowing to imports ratio and enhance the efficiency in using capital inflows to facilitate trade flows.
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The Welfare Implications of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Journal of International Money and Finance , 27(8), 2008, 1360-1382.
Abstract: This paper examines the welfare implications of foreign exchange intervention in a two-country, two-currency, general equilibrium model with limited participation in financial markets and cash-in-advance constraints on transactions. Both sterilized and nonsterilized intervention operations have significant impacts on the allocation of liquidity in international financial markets and therefore affect real economic activities. The welfare effects of shocks to monetary policy, sterilized and nonsterilized foreign exchange interventions are examined and compared. The design of welfare-maximizing intervention policy rules is also discussed.
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Inflation Taxation and Welfare with Externalities and Leisure
(with Jinli Zeng, and Jie Zhang)
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking , 39(1), 2007, 105-131
Abstract: This paper examines how inflation taxation affects resource allocation and welfare in a neoclassical growth model with leisure, a production externality and money in the utility function. Switching from consumption taxation to inflation taxation to finance government spending reduces real money balances relative to income, but increases consumption, labor, capital, and output. The net welfare effect of this switch depends crucially on the strength of the externality and on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. While it is always negative without the externality, it is likely to be positive with a strong externality and elastic intertemporal substitution.
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Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Analysis of the Transforming Chinese Economy
(with Michael K.Y. Fung and Lijing Zhu)
Pacific Economic Review , 10(1), 2005, 125-148
Abstract: We conduct a theoretical investigation into how financial reforms are affecting the long-run economic performance of the partially reformed Chinese economy. In a model with a dual structure in commodity production and financial repression, allowing the co-existence of a state banking system and an informal credit market and introducing heterogeneity in the transaction technologies of individuals, we examine the interactions between the state banking system and the informal credit market, and the effects of various measures of financial liberalization on individuals’ optimal portfolio choices and the macroeconomic aggregates.
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The Liquidity Effects of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Journal of Interational Economics , 63(1), 2004, 179-208
Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in a two-country, two-currency, general equilibrium model that allows for liquidity effects. Both sterilized and non-sterilized intervention operations have significant impacts on the allocation of liquidity in international financial markets. Whether intervention is successful in moving the exchange rate in the desirable direction depends upon the degree of sterilization of intervention and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution of the consumption goods. The model shows that there exist circumstances in which the response of exchange rate to intervention is ‘perverse’ as documented in the empirical literature.
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Stagflationary Effect of Government Bond Financing in the Transforming Chinese Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis
(with Michael K.Y. Fung and Lijing Zhu)
Journal of Development Economics , Vol.61, No.1, p.111-135, 2000.
Abstract: This paper studies how the method of government debt financing affects the macroeconomic performance of the transforming Chinese economy. The investigation is conducted within the context of an endogenous growth model that incorporates the major institutional features of the Chinese economy. Using this framework, we evaluate the effects on the growth rate of output and inflation if the Chinese government relies more on bonds and less on money creation for budget deficit and debt repayment financing. It is shown that although this policy change can reduce the growth rate of the money supply, it can generate a stagflationary effect: reducing the rate of output growth while raising the rate of inflation, if the initial fraction of government deficit and debt repayment financed by bonds is sufficiently small and the tax rate on labor income is sufficiently low.
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The Impact of Credit Control and Interest Rate Regulation on the Transforming Chinese Economy: An Analysis of Long-run Effects
(with Michael K.Y. Fung and Lijing Zhu)
Journal of Comparative Economics , 28(2), 2000, 293-320
Abstract: After identifying the two major institutional features of the Chinese economy, i.e., the coexistence of state-owned enterprises and private firms and tight governmental control over the financial sector, we incorporate these features into an endogenous growth model to investigate the long-run impacts of credit control and interest rate policies on the macroeconomic performance of the transforming Chinese economy. We find that (i) raising the interest rate on government bonds reduces the inflation rate without tempering the output growth rate, (ii) reducing the bank loans available to the state-owned enterprises may lower both the inflation rate and the output growth rate, (iii) increasing the nominal interest rate on bank deposits will exert a stagflationary effect on the economy, i.e., increasing the inflation rate but reducing the output growth rate, and (iv) changing the nominal interest rate on bank loans will have little real effect.
[go to paper]

Credit Market Imperfections and Exchange Rate Variability
Canadian Journal of Economics , 33(2), 2000, 360-393
Abstract: In this paper a two-country overlapping generations model is presented in which the roles of financial factors in the international monetary transmission mechanism are studied and whether and how the two types of credit market imperfections, limited participation, and costly state verification may contribute to the high variability of exchange rates are examined. Liquidity effects generated by monetary disturbances are shown to have qualitatively similar effects on the world economy in the perfect information case and in the costly information case. However, quantitative differences provide dfferent predictions about the variability of economic variables in the world economy. JEL Classification: F31, F41
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"Governor Ridge Plan to Privatize the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board", May, 1997 (30 pages)(with Stephen Herzenberg)

"Stanley Warner's Contributions to Statistically Balanced Information Technology", Survey Methodology, June 1995, vol. 21, no.1 pp. 7-12 (with Stephen E. Feinberg)

"Allen Implied Index Numbers", Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, Vol. 49, 1993, pp. 31-32

"Estimating Rent Equivalent from Canonical Correlations Between House Prices and Housing Rent", Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, 1989, pp. 473-474

"The Specification and Combination of Index Number Formulae" Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, 46th Session Contributed Papers Volume, 1987, pp. 203-204

“Logarithmic Index Numbers” (with Mirka Ondrack), Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, vol. 51, 1985, pp. 419-420

“The Present State of the Theory and Practice of Index Numbers”, Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, Vol. 50, 1983, pp. 122-147. (Translated into Italian and printed in Rassegna della lettratura sui cicli economici, INSTITUTO NAZIONALE PER LO STUDIO DELLA CONGIUNTURA, ANNO XXVIII, 1987, pp. 1-31.)

“Tests for the Normality of Box-Cox Transformation”, Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, Part II, Buenos Aires, 1982, pp. 277-284

“The Functional Form of the Relation Between Alternative Real Income Comparisons", Economic Journal, Vol. 89, 1979, pp. 127-130

”Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Price and Quantity Movements", Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, Vol. 39, 1973, pp. 555-561

“Fisher Ideal Index Reformulated", International Statistical Review, Vol. 40, 1972, pp. 47-51

“Note on Fisher Ideal Index", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series C, Vol. 21, 1972, pp. 89-92

“An Empirical Study of the Conventional and Statistical Theories of Index Numbers”, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 33, 1971, pp. 181-195.

Kimakova, A. (2010) "A Political Economy Model of Health Insurance Policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 23-36.

Kimakova, A. (2009) "Financial Markets and Exchange Rates in Transition to the European Monetary Union,” Intereconomics, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 142-148.

Kimakova, A. (2009) “Government Size and Openness Revisited: The Case of Financial Globalization,” Kyklos, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 394-406.

Kimakova, A. (2008) “The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Regime Choice: Theory and Evidence,” Economic Systems, Vol. 32, Iss. 4, pp. 354-371.

Kimakova, A. (2008) “Teaching Law and Economics from a Positive Perspective: The Political Economy of Policy Design in University Curricula”, Global Jurist, Vol. 8, Iss. 2.

Kimakova, A. (2006) "Does Globalization Enhance the Role of Fiscal Policy in Economic Stabilization?" Economics Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 11, pp. 1-11.

Kong, Y. "Introducing Social Investors into Multi-Agent Models of Financial Markets” ( with Stephen Chen and Brenda Spotton Visano), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4031, 2006

Kong, Y. “Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets-Reply” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.28, 2006, pp189-193

Kong, Y. “When Restricting Trade Is Necessary: An Economic Explanation”, The Business Review, Cambridge, 3(1), 2004, pp166-173.

Kong, Y. “Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.25, 2004, pp71-86.

Kong, Y. "Price Dispersion in a Model of Identical Agents with Perfect Information” (with Dr. Zhiqi Chen), Pacific Economic Review, 9:1, 2004, pp29-44.

Kong, Y. “Spinning off Low Cost Carriers-When It Does Make Sense?” (With Dr. Andre Le Dressay), Journal of Academy of Business and Economics, II (2), 2003, pp69-81.

Kong, Y. “Persistent Dumping, Competition and Welfare”, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 12 (1), 2003, pp 19-37.

Kong, Y. “Implementation Principles and Macro-management of the Development Plan of High-tech Research in China”, R&D Management, Vol.3, 1991.

Kong, Y. “The Core of Technical Progress-The Role of High-tech Industry “(with Zhouying Jin), Quantitative & Technical Economics, Vol.7, 1990.

Kong, Y. “The Development Strategy for China’s Ocean High Technology”, Marine Information, 1990

Kong, Y. “Rational System of Basic Research –The Role of Universities and Colleges”, R&D Management Vol. 2, 1990.

Kong, Y. “The Optimal Strategy and Policy of Chinese High-tech Industry Development”, China Science and Technology Industries, Vol.7, 1989

Kong, Y. “The Strategy of Multi-aim Education System”, Modern Management Thesis Collection, 1985.

Kong, Y. “The Theory and Application of SQUID (Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices)”, Instrument and Future, Vol.4, 1984.

Diagnostic Analysis and Computational Strategies for Estimating Discrete Time Duration Models - A Monte Carlo Study
(with Barry Smith)
Journal of Econometrics , Volume 187, Issue 1, July 2015, pp. 275-292
Abstract: This paper uses Monte Carlo analysis to study important and contentious issues in estimating single-spell discrete time duration models. We find simulated annealing dominates gradient methods for recovering true models. We recommend a partially flexible step function for duration dependence combined with likelihood ratio tests for determining support points of unobserved heterogeneity. We find that ignoring time-changing features of explanatory variables introduces substantial biases in model coefficient and average partial effect estimates. These biases do not diminish as sample size increases.
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Propensity Score Matching, a Distance-Based Measure of Migration, and the Wage Growth of Young Men
(with John C. Ham and Patricia B. Reagan)
Journal of Econometrics , 161(2), 2011, pp.208-227
Abstract: Our paper estimates the effect of US internal migration on wage growth for young men between their first and second job. Our analysis of migration extends previous research by: (i) exploiting the distance-based measures of migration in the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1979 (NLSY79); (ii) allowing the effect of migration to differ by schooling level and (iii) using propensity score matching to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for movers and (iv) using local average treatment effect (LATE) estimators with covariates to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) and ATET for compliers. We believe the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) is reasonable for our matching estimators since the NLSY79 provides a relatively rich array of variables on which to match. Our matching methods are based on local linear, local cubic, and local linear ridge regressions. Local linear and local ridge regression matching produce relatively similar point estimates and standard errors, while local cubic regression matching badly over-fits the data and provides very noisy estimates. We use the bootstrap to calculate standard errors. Since the validity of the bootstrap has not been investigated for the matching estimators we use, and has been shown to be invalid for nearest neighbor matching estimators, we conduct a Monte Carlo study on the appropriateness of using the bootstrap to calculate standard errors for local linear regression matching. The data generating processes in our Monte Carlo study are relatively rich and calibrated to match our empirical models or to test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of parameter values. The estimated standard errors from the bootstrap are very close to those from the Monte Carlo experiments, which lends support to our using the bootstrap to calculate standard errors in our setting. From the matching estimators we find a significant positive effect of migration on the wage growth of college graduates, and a marginally significant negative effect for high school dropouts. We do not find any significant effects for other educational groups or for the overall sample. Our results are generally robust to changes in the model specification and changes in our distance-based measure of migration. We find that better data matters; if we use a measure of migration based on moving across county lines, we overstate the number of moves, while if we use a measure based on moving across state lines, we understate the number of moves. Further, using either the county or state measures leads to much less precise estimates.
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Public Policy and the Dynamics of Children’s Health Insurance, 1986-1999
(with John Ham and Lara Shore-Sheppard)
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings , 99(2), 2009, pp.522-526
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Propensity Score Matching and Abnormal Performance After Seasoned Equity Offerings
(with Xinlei Zhao)
Journal of Empirical Finance , 13(3), 2006, pp.351-370
Abstract: The long-run underperformance of stocks after seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is a major challenge to the efficient market hypothesis. We reexamine the SEO underperformance anomaly using the propensity score matching method on a sample of around 2000 offerings between 1986 and 1998. While underperformance characterizes equal-weight and buy-and-hold returns if traditional matching methods are used, the underperformance is economically and statistically insignificant when we match issuers to non-issuers by propensity scores. Our results suggest that SEO underperformance manifests statistical inadequacies of traditional matching methods rather than an anomaly challenging the efficient market hypothesis.
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Possibility and Permissibility, Mathematical Social Sciences, 62 (2011), 109-113.

Correlated Nash Equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (2009), 722–743.

Risk, Ambiguity, and the Klibanoff Axioms, Economics Bulletin, 4 (2008), 1–5.

Sharing Beliefs about Actions, Mathematical Social Sciences, 53 (2007), 123–133.

Agreement and Stochastic Independence of Belief Functions, Mathematical Social Sciences, 51 (2006), 1–22.

A Robust Definition of Possibility for Biseparable Preferences, Economics Bulletin, 4 (2006), 1–7.

More Likely than Unlikely, Mathematical Social Sciences, 49 (2005), 39–53.

Likely Events and Possible States, Topics in Theoretical Economics, 5 (2005), Article 4.

Correlated Equilibrium under Uncertainty, Mathematical Social Sciences, 44 (2002), 183–209.

Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon–Contaminated Beliefs, Mathematical Social Sciences, 39 (2000), 207–234.

Rationalizability and the Savage Axioms, Economic Theory, 15 (2000), 727–733.

A Note on Mutually Absolutely Continuous Belief Systems, Economics Letters, 68 (2000), 149–156.

Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality, Economic Theory, 14 (1999), 621–633.

Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players, Games and Economic Behavior, 28 (1999), 256–270.

Sealed Bid Auctions with Uncertainty Averse Bidders, Economic Theory, 12 (1998), 1–20 (lead article).

Weighted and Quadratic Models of Choice under Uncertainty, Economics Letters, 50 (1996), 381–386.

Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory, 71 (1996), 443–484. Reprinted in Uncertainty in Economic Theory—Essays in Honor of David Schmeidler’s 65th Birthday, I. Gilboa, Ed., Routledge: London (2004), 483–521.

Population Dynamics and Marriage Payments: An Analysis of the Long Run Equilibrium in India.
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 18(2), June 2018.

Class Matters: Tracking Urban Inequality in Post-Liberalization India using a Durables-based Mixture Model.
Applied Economics Letters, 24(17), 1203-1207, October 2017.

The Poor Get Poorer: Tracking Relative Poverty in India using a Durables-based Mixture Model.
Journal of Development Economics, 119, 110-120, 2016.

Can patient self-management explain the health gradient? Goldman and Smith's "Can patient self-management help explain the SES health gradient?" (2002) revisited.
Social Science and Medicine , 70(6), March 2010, pp. 802-812
Abstract: In their much-cited paper, "Can patient self-management help explain the SES health gradient?", Goldman and Smith (2002) use samples of diabetic and HIV+ patients in the United States to conclude that disease self-management is an important explanation for the much-documented positive gradient in education and health outcomes. In this paper, I revisit their analysis and point to some fundamental difficulties in interpreting their results as conclusive evidence in favor of self-management. I also argue that for individuals for whom self-management might be expected to matter -i.e. populations of patients managing complex conditions - economic factors such as resource availability and insurance access might be a more important mechanism behind the gradient than medical compliance. The impact of self-management, though it might matter, is likely to be small.
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Effect of Retirement on Life Satisfaction in Canada: Evidence from the 2008–2009 Canadian Community Health Survey–Healthy Aging

“Reconceptualizing Health Security in post-COVID-19 World (with Amy Barlow and Benjamin Johnson)” BMJ Global Health. Volume 6, Issue 7. 2021.

“Reform of Primary Health Care in Pakistan.” (with Zulfiqar Bhutta) The Lancet. Volume 392. Issue 10156. October 20, 2018.

Equity in the use of public services for mother and newborn child health care in Pakistan: a utilization incidence analysis. International Journal for Equity in Health (2016) 15:120 Go To Paper

Mapping Vulnerability to Climate Change and its Repercussions on Human Health in Pakistan (with Haroon Awan and Niazullah Khan. Globalization and Health 2012, 8:31. Go To Paper

The Economic Burden of Blindness in Pakistan: A Socio-economic and Policy Imperative for Poverty Reduction Strategies. (with Haroon Awan and Niazullah Khan) Indian Journal of Ophthalmology. 2012, Volume 60; Issue 5. Pages: 358-364. Go To Paper

Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict in Pakistan: Is there a link? Economic and Political Weekly. 2009. Vol. XLIV No. 34.Go To Paper

A New General Equilibrium Welfare Measure with Application to Labour Income Taxes (joint with Leo Michelis and Constantine Angyridis). The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2022, vol 1, pp. 1-25

“Measuring the Contribution of Durable Goods to the Welfare Cost of Inflation” (joint with Leo Michelis). Canadian Journal of Economics, 49(2) May 2016, 815–833.

On the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments. Open Economies Review 25, September 2014, 721-737.

Real Asset Returns, Inflation and Activity in a Small, Open, Cash-in-Advance Economy (joint with Mohammed Mohsin). Journal of International Money and Finance, 32 February 2013, 234–250.

Money, Capital and the Pigou Effect. Economics Letters, vol. 117, October 2012, 354–356.

On Money and Capital with Durable Goods (joint with Leo Michelis). Economics Letters, Vol. 107 (1), April 2010, 36–38

The Effects of Inflation in a Small Open Economy with Durability in Consumption (joint with Mohammed Mohsin). Open Economies Review, Vol. 21 (2), April 2010, 221–236.

Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy with Durable Goods and Differing Cash-in-Advance Constraints (joint with Leo Michelis). Economics Letters, Vol. 107 (2), May 2010, 246–248

Savings, Investment, Employment, and Inflation in a Small Open Economy with Habit Persistence (joint with Leo Michelis and Mohammed Mohsin). Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 14, June 2010, 365–387.

Inflation Stabilization with Durable Goods and Endogenous Time Preference (joint with Mohammed Mohsin). Economic Record, Vol. 86, September 2010, 342–351.

On the Employment, Investment, and Current Account Effects of Trade Liberalizations with Durability in Consumption (joint with Mohammed Mohsin). North American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 21, December 2010, 228–240

Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy with Marshallian Preferences (joint with Constantine Angyridis). The Economic Record, Vol. 85, March 2009, 21–31.

The Harberger-Laursen-Metzler Effect with Marshallian Preferences (joint with Constantine Angyridis). Economics Bulletin, Vol. 6 (11), March 2008, pp. 1–11.

Durable Goods, Time Preference, and the Dynamics of the Current Account (joint with Mohammed Mohsin). Open Economies Review, Vol. 19 (3), July 2008, pp. 337–354.

The Transition to a New Inflation Rate in Models with Habit Formation (joint with Leo Michelis). Economics Letters, vol. 91(1), April 2006, 56–60.

On the Employment, Investment and Current Account Effects of Inflation (joint with Mohammed Mohsin). Journal of International Economics, vol. 70(1), September 2006, 296–313.

Money, Habits and Growth (joint with Leo Michelis). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 29(7), July 2005, 1267–1285.

Money, Capital and Real Liquidity Effects with Habits Formation (joint with Leo Michelis). Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 38(2), May 2005, 430–453.

Monetary Policy in a Cash-in-Advance Economy: Employment, Capital Accumulation and the Term Structure of Interest Rates (joint with Mohammed Mohsin). Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 37(2), May 2004, 336–352.

Durable Goods, Habits, Time Preference and Exchange Rates (joint with Simon Neaime). North American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 14 (1), March 2003: 115–130.

Habits and Durability in Consumption and the Effects of Exchange Rate Policies (joint with Simon Neaime). International Economic Journal, vol. 16, Summer 2002, pages 97–114.

Risk Sharing and Redistribution in a Federal System with Population Mobility and Long Horizons. Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 33, August 2000, 662–676.

Habits and Durability in Consumption and the Effects of Tariff Protection (joint with Simon Neaime). Open Economies Review, vol. 11, July 2000, 195–204.

Habits and Durability in Consumption and the Dynamics of the Current Account. Journal of International Economics: vol. 44, February 1998, 69–82.

On the Consequences of Government Objectives for Economies with Mobile Population (joint with Gordon Myers). Journal of Public Economics, vol. 63, January 1997, 265–281.

On the Macroeconomic Policy Implications of Habit Persistence. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, vol.28, February 1996, 119–129.

Private Sector versus Public Sector Externalities in a Federation (joint with Gordon Myers). Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 26, 1996, 543–555.

Budget Deficits, Corporate Income Taxes, and the Current Account. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, vol. 27, May 1995, 378–388.

Habit Persistence and the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler Effect in an Infinite Horizon Model. Journal of International Economics, vol. 34, February 1993, 153–166.

Tariffs, Habit Persistence, and the Current Account. Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 26, February 1993, 194–207.

Attachment to Home, and Efficient Purchases of Population, in a Fiscal Externality Economy (joint with Gordon Myers). Journal of Public Economics, vol. 52, August 1993, 117–132.

International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Economic Growth (joint with Michael Devereux). International Economic Review, vol. 33, May 1992, 249–268.

Income Effect, Wealth Effect and the Terms of Trade with Finite Horizons. Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 25, May 1992, 474–484.

Resource Discoveries and "Excessive" External Borrowing. Economic Journal, vol. 101, November 1991, 1497–1509.

Philip Oreopoulos & Richard W. Patterson & Uros Petronijevic & Nolan G. Pope, 2022.
"Low-Touch Attempts to Improve Time Management among Traditional and Online College Students,"
Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-43.

Michael Gilraine & Uros Petronijevic & John D. Singleton, 2021.
"Horizontal Differentiation and the Policy Effect of Charter Schools,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 239-276, August.

Oreopoulos, Philip & Petronijevic, Uros & Logel, Christine & Beattie, Graham, 2020.
"Improving non-academic student outcomes using online and text-message coaching,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 342-360.

Christopher R. Dobronyi & Philip Oreopoulos & Uros Petronijevic, 2019.
"Goal Setting, Academic Reminders, and College Success: A Large-Scale Field Experiment,"
Journal of Research on Educational Effectiveness, 12:1, pages 38-66.

Philip Oreopoulos & Uros Petronijevic, 2018.
"Student Coaching: How Far Can Technology Go?,"
Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 53(2), pages 299-329.

A Positive Analysis of Fairtrade Certification
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 116, pp. 169-185, September 2015.
Abstract: The Fairtrade program transfers income to farmers by establishing a price floor and an alternate distribution channel that bypasses intermediaries between the raw commodity and world markets. I develop a model of the international commodity supply chain, with monopolistic ally competitive final goods producers and consumers who value the ethical quality of goods. A small number of oligopsonistic intermediaries purchase the raw commodity from farmers in given country and then sell to final goods producers in the world market. I consider the effects of a Fairtrade program that is too small to have an effect on the world price of the commodity. I show that the Fairtrade program decreases the intermediaries' market power and consequently, even farmers that are not selected into the program receive a higher wage than in the absence of the program. I establish the Pareto optimal Fairtrade price and assess the overall efficiency of the program. The program is a more efficient way to transfer income to farmers than a direct transfer equal to the premium commanded by certified products if the Fairtrade price is not set too high above the efficient wage for farmers. If the number of intermediaries were large, however, then the direct transfer is more efficient than the program even for small binding price floors.

Certification Programs and North-South Trade
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 108, pp. 90-104, December 2013.
Abstract: This paper studies how the voluntary standards established by certification programs affect consumer welfare and international trade in an open world economy. I develop a two-country model with differentiated products and imperfectly-informed consumers. Consumers in both countries value the quality of goods, but cannot discern their quality unless they are certified. Firms in each country differ in their abilities to produce quality, and the distribution of technological ability is superior in the home country. I first consider the circumstance in which the home country's government unilaterally administers a certification program. I show that the home country's terms of trade are increasing in the standard. It follows that the standard chosen by the home country is protectionist in the sense that it is greater than the standard that would be chosen by a world welfare maximizing authority. Also, the volume of trade is lower under the home country's program than if the standard were chosen by a world authority. The volume of trade and foreign welfare, however, are greater under the home country's program than if there is no certification program at all. Next, I consider the case where a certification program is administered by each country, and standards are set non-cooperatively. I show that the home and foreign country standards are strategic complements. The paper concludes with a discussion of the global inefficiencies that result from the non-cooperative setting of voluntary standards and their policy implications.

A Survey of Environmental Labeling
Essays on Environmental Labeling (Dissertation), Princeton University, ProQuest/UMI, Ann Arbor (Publication No. 3338691), 2008.
Abstract: This paper critically assesses the literature on environmental labeling.

"Local Information, Income Segregation, and Geographic Mobility" (with Timothy N. Bond) The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 18, no. 3 (2018), pp 1-17.
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"Ideology and Migration after the American Civil War" (with Shari Eli and Allison Shertzer), Journal of Economic History 78, no. 3 (2018), pp 822-861.
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"Three-Generation Mobility in the United States, 1850-1940: The Role of Paternal and Maternal Grandparents" (with Claudia Olivetti and Daniele Paserman), Explorations in Economic History 70 (2018), pp 73-90.
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"Women's Income and Marriage Markets in the United States: Evidence from the Civil War Pension," Journal of Economic History 77, no. 1 (2017), pp 1-38.
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"Patronage Politics and the Development of the Welfare State: Confederate Pensions in the American South" (with Shari Eli), Journal of Economic History 76, no. 4 (2016), pp 1078-1112.
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"Selective Migration, Wages, and Occupational Mobility in Nineteenth Century America," Explorations in Economic History, 53 (2014), pp 40-63.
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Lu Han, Chandler Lutz, Benjamin Sand, Derek Stacey, The Effects of a Targeted Financial Constraint on the Housing Market, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 34, Issue 8, August 2021, Pages 3742–3788, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab047

David A. Green & René Morissette & Ben M. Sand & Iain Snoddy, 2019.
"Economy-Wide Spillovers from Booms: Long-Distance Commuting and the Spread of Wage Effects,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(S2), pages 643-687.

Paul Beaudry & David A. Green & Ben M. Sand, 2018.
"In Search of Labor Demand,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2714-2757, September.

Paul Beaudry & David A. Green & Benjamin M. Sand, 2016. "The Great Reversal in the Demand for Skill and Cognitive Tasks," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(S1), pages S199 - S247.

David A. Green & Benjamin M. Sand, 2015. "Has the Canadian labour market polarized?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(2), pages 612-646, May.

Beaudry, Paul & Green, David A. & Sand, Benjamin M., 2014. "Spatial equilibrium with unemployment and wage bargaining: Theory and estimation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 2-19.

Paul Beaudry & David A. Green & Benjamin M. Sand, 2014. "The Declining Fortunes of the Young since 2000," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 381-86, May.

Sand, Benjamin M., 2013. "A re-examination of the social returns to education: Evidence from U.S. cities," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 97-106.

Paul Beaudry & David A. Green & Benjamin Sand, 2012. "Does Industrial Composition Matter for Wages? A Test of Search and Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(3), pages 1063-1104, 05.

"The measure of relative risk aversion in the consumption CAPM with power utility", Applied Financial Economics Letters (from 2009 incorporated into Applied Economics Letters), Vol. 2, Issue 2 (March 2006), 111-114.

"Disentangling risk aversion and intertemporal substitution through a reference level" (co-authored with R. Garcia and É. Renault), Finance Research Letters, Vol. 3, Issue 3 (September 2006), 181-193 (winner of the Stephen A. Ross Best Paper Award for the best article published in Finance Research Letters in 2006).

"Testing the random walk hypothesis through robust estimation of correlation", Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Vol. 52, Issue 5 (January 2008), 2504-2513.

"Historical simulation approach to the estimation of stochastic discount factor models", Quantitative Finance, Vol. 8, Issue 4 (June 2008), 391-404.

"Estimation of the consumption CAPM with imperfect sample separation information", International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 13, Issue 4 (October 2008), 333-348.

"Risk factor beta conditional Value-at-Risk", Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 28, Issue 6 (September 2009), 549-558.

"Departures from rational expectations and asset pricing anomalies", Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 10, Issue 4 (December 2009), 234-241.

"Uninsurable risk and financial market puzzles" (co-authored with P. Basu and K. Wada), Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 30, Issue 6 (October 2011), 1055-1089.

"Behavioral heuristics and financial modelling", Editorial, Journal of Stock & Forex Trading, Vol. 1, Issue 3 (July 2012).

"Is consumption risk priced in the stock market?", Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 26, Issue C (March 2014), 112-130.

"The small-cap effect in the predictability of individual stock returns", International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 38 (July 2015), 178-197.

"Background risk in consumption and the equity risk premium", Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 48, Issue 2 (February 2017), 407-439.

"Measuring the stock's factor beta and identifying risk factors under market inefficiency", The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 80 (May 2021), 635-649.

Cater, Bruce, Lew, Byron. and Barry Smith (2008). “A theory of tenure-track contracts.” Education Economics, Volume 16, Issue 2, 203-218.

Chak, P.M., Madras, N. and B. Smith (2005) “Semi-nonparametric estimation with Bernstein polynomials.” Economics Letters, 89, 153-156.

Cater, B. and J. Barry Smith (1999) “Inferring Disability from Post-Injury Employment Duration” Applied Economics Letters, 6, 747-751.

Breslaw, Jon A. and J. Barry Smith (1995), “Measuring Welfare Changes when Quantity is Constrained”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 13, No. 1, 1-9.

Smith J. Barry and Jon A. Breslaw (1995) “A Simple and Efficient Method for Estimating the Magnitude and Precision of Welfare Changes.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, 313-327.
Abstract: In this article we propose a simple and efficient method of estimating welfare measures in an n-equation system. We also estimate the variance of these measures. The accuracy and convergence properties of our approach are studied: the algorithm converges quadratically. This is a distinct improvement over the Vartia algorithm which converges linearly. We demonstrate the method by evaluating the welfare consequences of price changes in the provision of health care. The GAUSS code, which is very short, is included.
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Rahman, A.H., Gandhi, D. and J. Barry Smith (1994), “Industrial Land Value and Asset Size: Theory and Evidence”, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 11(2), 177-180.

Plourde, Charles and J. Barry Smith (1993), “Reply”, Journal of Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 73-76.

Plourde, Charles and J. Barry Smith (1990c), “Crop Sharing in the Fishery and Industry Equilibrium”, Journal of Marine Resource Economics, Vol 6, No. 3, 179-194.

Katz, E. and J. Barry Smith, (1990b), “On the Social Costs of Rent Seeking Versus the Social Costs of Production Flexibility”, Public Choice, 66, 67-77.

Smith, J. Barry and S. Weber (1990a), “Leadership and Expenditures in Rent Seeking Models”, Public Choice, 65, 257-266.
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Smith, J. Barry and S. Weber (1989a), “Rent Seeking Behaviour of Retaliating Agents”, Public Choice, 61, 153-166.
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Katz, E. and J. Barry Smith (1988b), “Rent Seeking and Optimal Regulation in Replenishible Resource Industries”, Public Choice, 59, 25-36.
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Smith, J. Barry and S. Weber (1988b), “Contemporaneous Externalities, Rational Expectations and Equilibrium Production Functions in Natural Resource Models”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 17, 155-170.
Abstract: This paper examines traditional approaches to modeling production processes in resource industries and finds that they are often incomplete with respect to desired properties and restrictions. A new notion of equilibrium production functions is introduced in which explicit account is taken of the recognised interdependence of firms involved in extraction. The results are quite encouraging. In particular, the resultant model of production has the ex ante desired technical, externality, mass balance, aggregation, and heterogeneity properties. As well, it provides useful insights for empirical research. Finally, this new approach with its explicit recognition of the interdependence of firms has the potential for providing new directions into the analysis of industry equilibrium and regulation of resource industries.
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Smith, J. Barry and M. Stelcner (1988a), “Labour Supply of Married Women in Canada: 1980”, Canadian Journal of Economics, XXI, No. 4, 857-870.

Smith, J. Barry (1986), “Stochastic Steady-State Replenishable Resource Management Policies”, Journal of Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 155-168.

Smith, J. Barry and W.A. Sims (1985), “The Impact of Environmental Regulation Upon Productivity Growth”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, No.3, Autumn, 410-423.
Abstract: This article presents an econometric analysis of the productivity impact of pollution charges on firms in the Canadian brewing industry. We estimate a translog cost function that allows for differences between regulated and unregulated plants. Productivity is measured by the standard residual method. The empirical work, which is based on plant level data from a single industry, suggests that pollution charges have a negative impact on productivity growth. This, however, is not necessarily undesirable, since accompanying these costs are definite benefits in terms of a cleaner environment.
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Breslaw, J. and J. Barry Smith (1984b), “Duality and A-J Regulated Cost Functions: A Reply and Extensions”, Land Economics, Vol. 60, No. 2, 222-227.

Smith, J. Barry (1984a), “A Discrete Model of Replenishable Resource Management Under Uncertainty”, Journal of Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 1, No. 3, 283-308.
Abstract: This paper partially extends the replenishable resource management literature to the case of uncertainty. Stochastic resource dynamics are defined, studied and estimated. The results of this study suggest that the misallocation of resources into the northern lobster fishery has been greater than was previously believed. While aggregate stochastic influences are small in the lobster fishery, the dynamics of whales appear to be significantly affected by stochastic influences.
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Breslaw, J. and J. Barry Smith (1983b), “Some Encouraging Firm-Level Evidence for Duality Theory”, L'Actualité Economique, 59, No. 2, 222-227.

Irvine, I. and J. Barry Smith (1983a), “The Estimation of Local Government Expenditure Responses to Inter-Governmental Transfers”, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXV, No. 3, 534-536.
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Breslaw, J. and J. Barry Smith (1982b), “Efficiency, Equity and Regulation: An Optimal Pricing Model of Bell Canada”, Canadian Journal of Economics, XV, No. 4, 634-648.

Breslaw, J. and J. Barry Smith (1982a), “The Restrictiveness of Flexible Functional Forms and the Measurement of Regulatory Constraint”, Land Economics, Vol. 58, 4, 553-559.

Smith, J. Barry (1980), “Replenishable Resource Management Under Uncertainty”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 7, 209-219.

Smithin, J. “Interest and profit”, Chinese Business Review 8, 6, June 2009, 1-13.
---- reprinted in T. Cate (ed.) Keynes's General Theory after Seventy-Five Years, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming.

Mongiovi, G., Pressman, S. and J. Smithin, “John Derek Pheby: October 24, 1949 – October 21, 2008”, Review of Political Economy 21, 2, April 2009, 191-93.

Atesoglu, H.S. and J. Smithin, “Canadian monetary policy and the US federal funds rate”, Applied Economics Letters 15, 11, September 2008, 899-904.

Smithin, J., “The rate of interest, monetary policy, and the concept of ‘thrift’”, International Journal of Political Economy 32, 2, Summer 2008, 26-48.
Abstract: This article examines several aspects of monetary policy. Much of the discussion involves the work of prominent economist John Maynard Keynes, who developed the concepts of thrift, spending multipliers and the marginal efficiency of capital. The history and development of some Keynesian concepts are presented. Reconciliation of monetary theories such as the real rate of interest and the concepts of endogenous money and credit creation are investigated. Contemporary debates and critiques of Keynes's work are also presented.
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Kam, E. and J. Smithin “’Unequal partners: the role of international financial flows and the exchange rate regime’," Journal of Economic Asymmetries 5, 1, June 2008,125-37.

Smithin, J. “A real interest rule for monetary policy?”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 30, 1 Fall 2007, 101-118.
Abstract: This paper examines four alternative types of guidelines for monetary policy: (1) stabilizing the real policy rate of interest at a "low" level, (2) pegging the nominal policy rate, (3) employing a standard monetary policy reaction function to target inflation, and (4) invoking the notion of a "fair" rate of interest. The case defended here is that the first of these alternatives, an attempt to stabilize the real policy rate at some "low" level, is the best option for monetary policy. It is also the most consistent with the traditional Keynesian advocacy of cheap moneya?”"we intend to retain control of our domestic rate of interest, and keep it as low as suits our own purposes."
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Atesolgu, H.S. and J. Smithin, “Un modelo macroeconomico simple," Economia Informa, 346, May-June 2007, 105-119.

Atesoglu, H.S. and J. Smithin, “Inflation targeting in a simple macroeconomic model”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 28, 4, Summer 2006, 673-688.

Atesoglu, H.S. and J. Smithin, “Real wages, productivity, and economic growth in the G7, 1960-2002”, Review of Political Economy, 18, 2, April 2006, 1-11.

Smithin, J. “The real rate of interest, the business cycle, economic growth and inflation: an alternative theoretical perspective”, Journal of Economic Asymmetries, 2, 2, December 2005, 1-19.

Kam, E. and J. Smithin “Notas sobre el dinero, credito y banca en el proceso de desarrollo economico”, Economia Informa, 337, November-December 2005, 6-16.

Kam, E., and J. Smithin, “Monetary policy and demand management for the small open economy in contemporary conditions with (perfectly) mobile capital”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 26, 4, Summer 2004, 679-94.

Smithin, J., “Keynes, Friedman and Chicago: a review essay”, Journal of Economic Studies 31, 1, February 2004, 76-88.

Smithin, J., “Can we afford to pay for social programs?”, Studies in Political Economy 71/72, Autumn/Winter, 2003, 163-76.

Smithin, J., “Interest parity, purchasing power parity, ‘risk premia’ and Post Keynesian economic analysis”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 25, 2, Winter, 2003, 219-35.

Lau, J.Y.F., and J. Smithin, “The role of money in capitalism”, International Journal of Political Economy 32, 3, Fall 2002 (2004), 5-22.

Paraskevopoulos, C.C., and J. Smithin, “Integracion economica y financiera: implicaciones sobre la politica fiscal y social de una nacion”, Revista Economica de Castilla La Mancha 1,Segundo Semestre 2002, 197-209.
----- revised and up-dated version of “Economic and financial integration: implications for nationally-based public policy”, in C.C. Paraskevopoulos (ed.), Global Trading Arrangements in Transition, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998, 3-10.

Smithin, J., “Profit, the rate of interest, and ‘entrepreneurship’ in contemporary capitalism”, Kurswechsel 2/01, July 2001, 89-100.
------- Spanish translation in Cuestiones Economicas 18, 1, Primer Cuatrimester 2002, 191-208.

Dow, S.C. and J. Smithin, “The structure of financial markets and the ‘first principles’ of monetary economics”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 46, 1, February 1999, 72-90.

Smithin, J., “Money and national sovereignty in the global economy”, Eastern Economic Journal 25, 1, Winter 1999, 49-61.

Paschakis, J. and J. Smithin, “Exchange risk and the supply-side effects of real interest rate changes”, Journal of Macroeconomics 20, 4, Fall 1998, 703-20.

Smithin, H. and J. Smithin, “Spolecna mena: nove moznosti, nebo hrozba?”, Novy Domov 25, August 1998.

Smithin, J., “An alternative monetary model of inflation and growth”, Review of Political Economy 9, 4, October 1997, 395-409.

Paschakis, J., Paraskevopoulos, C.C. and J. Smithin, “Is monetary sovereignty an option for the small open economy?”, North American Journal of Economics and Finance 7, 1, Spring 1996, 5-18.

Smithin, J., “Hicks on Keynes and Thornton”, Canadian Journal of Economics (Special Issue, Part 1) 29, April 1996, S235-41.

Smithin, J., “The crisis in academic economics”, PKSG Newsletter 4, January 1996, 02-04.

Smithin, J., “Cause and effect in the relationship between budget deficits and the rate of interest”, Economies et Societies – Monnaie et Production 28, 1-2, January-February, 1994, 151-69.

Smithin, J. “Do nothing to halt fragile recovery”, Town Crier (Newmarket: ON), March 03, 1994.

MacKinnon, K.T. and J. Smithin “An interest rate peg, inflation and output”, Journal of Macroeconomics 15, 4, Fall 1993, 769-85.

Smithin, J. and B.M. Wolf, “What would be a ‘Keynesian’ approach to currency and exchange rate issues?”, Review of Political Economy 5, 3, July 1993, 365-83.

Dow, S.C. and J. Smithin, “Free banking in Scotland, 1695-1845”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 39, 4, November 1992, 374-90.

Smithin, J., “La composicion del gasto publico y la eficacia de la politica fiscal”, Hacienda Publica Espanola 117, 1/1991, 171-09.
----- Spanish translation of “The composition of government expenditures and the effectiveness of fiscal policy” in J.D. Pheby (ed.), New Directions in Post Keynesian Economics, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989, 209-227.
----- French translation in P. Paquette and M. Seccareccia (eds), Les pieges de l'austerite: dette nationale et prosperite economique: alternatives a l'orthodoxie, Montreal and Grenoble: Presses de l'Universite de Montreal and Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1993, 200-17

Smithin, J., “Empirical and conceptual problems in contemporary macroeconomics”, British Review of Economic Issues 12, 27, June 1990, 73-95.

Smithin, J., “Hicksian monetary economics and contemporary financial innovation”, Review of Political Economy 1, 2, July 1989, 192-207.

Smithin, J., “On flexible wage policy”, Economies et Societies - Oeconomia 22, 3, March 1988, 135-53.

Hamouda, O.F. and J. Smithin, “Some remarks on ‘uncertainty and economic analysis’”, Economic Journal 98, 1, March 1988, 59-64.

Hamouda, O.F. and J. Smithin, “Rational behaviour with deficient foresight”, Eastern Economic Journal 14,3, July-September, 1988, 277-85.

Smithin, J. and P.N.V. Tu, “Disequilibrium adjustment in a ‘classical’ macroeconomic model: a note”, Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 47, 2, 1987, 98-102.

Smithin, J. “The length of the production period and effective stabilization policy”, Journal of Macroeconomics 8, 1, Winter 1986, 55-62.

Lemche, S.Q. and J. Smithin, “Nominal wage contracts and the economics of Keynes (abstract)," The Bulletin of the History of Economics Society 7, 1, Summer 1986, 2.

Smithin, J. “The market mechanism versus the historical process as the source of economic controversy”, Economic Notes 14, 1, 1985, 169-76.

Smithin, J. “On the definition of involuntary unemployment in Keynes’s General Theory: a note”, History of Political Economy 17, 2, Summer 1985, 219-22.

Smithin, J., “Medio and Musu’s Keynesian analysis of money wage changes: a comment”, Economic Notes 12, 3, 1984, 167-70

Smithin, J., “Financial innovation and monetary theory”, Three Banks Review 144, December 1984, 26-38.

Smithin, J., “A note on the welfare cost of perfectly anticipated inflation”, Bulletin of Economic Research 35, 1, May 1983, 65-69.

Smithin, J., “Two ‘contradictions’ in the economic and social development of the Soviet bloc”, Kosmas: Journal of Czechoslovak and Central European Studies 1, 2, Winter 1982, 51-62.

Brzozowski, M., & Visano, B. Spotton (2023). Canadian Consumer Financial Vulnerability, Stress, and Well-Being. Canadian Public Policy, 49(2), 114-135.

Brzozowski, M., Spotton Visano, B. “Havin’ Money’s Not Everything, Not Havin’ It Is”: The Importance of Financial Satisfaction for Life Satisfaction in Financially Stressed Households. J Happiness Studies 21, 573–591 (2020).

Spotton Visano, Brenda “Gendering Post-Keynesian Macroeconomics with Situated Knowledge” Review of Radical Political Economics v.49 n.4 (2017): 567-573. Available online

Spotton Visano, Brenda “Defying the Dominant Discourse: Why contesting Neoliberalism needs Critical Pedagogy in Economics Education" Critical Studies in Education Available online

Britto, Neil and Brenda Spotton Visano “Building community capacity: Self-assessment performance metrics for Canadian microcredit programs,” Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation 2018 v.33 n.1

Spotton Visano, Brenda “From Challenging the Text to Constructing It in a Large Economics Classroom: Revealing the not-so-common sense of the capitalist mode of production” Review of Radical Political Economics Available online

Spotton Visano, Brenda & Imo Ek-Udofia "Inclusive financial literacy education for inspiring a critical financial consciousness: an experiment in partnership with marginalised youth." International Journal of Inclusive Education 21.7 (2017): 763-774. Available online

Spotton Visano, Brenda “Gendering Social Location in a Post-Keynesian Theory of Financial Crises” Studies in Political Economy 97(1) (2016): 95-103. Available online

Ahmed Allahwala, Susannah Bunce , Lesley Beagrie , Shauna Brail , Timothy Hawthorne , Sue Levesque, Jürgen von Mahs & Brenda Spotton Visano, (2013) Building and Sustaining Community-University Partnerships in Marginalized Urban Areas Journal of Geography, 112:2, 43-57 Available online

Stephen Chen, Brenda Spotton Visano, Michael Lui, Chaohui Lu “Evidence of Social Referencing Behaviour during Market Bubbles” IAENG International Journal of Computer Science, 2010. Volume 37 Issue 4, Pages 359-366 London, U.K Available online

S. Chen, J. Tien, and B. Spotton Visano “A Hybrid Multi-agent Model for Financial Markets” In: Nguyen N.T., Borzemski L., Grzech A., Ali M. (eds) New Frontiers in Applied Artificial Intelligence of Lecture Notes in Computer Science IEA/AIE vol 5027, pp. 531–540. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg Available online

Spotton Visano, Brenda “Different and Unequal: Payday Loans and Microcredit in Canada” Journal of Economic Asymmetries 2008 Vol.5 No.1, 109-123

"Introducing Social Investors into Multi-Agent Models of Financial Markets" (S. Chen,B. Spotton Visano and Y. Kong) Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 2006. 4031: 44-53.

Spotton Visano, Brenda “Financial Manias and Panics: A Socioeconomic Perspective” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2002 61(4): 801-822. Excerpted and Translated 2003. «Bulles et paniques financières : une perspective socio-economique » in Problèmes Economiques No 2385 Mer 10 (Dec): 7-14

"Efficient Markets, Fundamentals, and Crashes: American Theories of Financial Crises and Market Volatility" (Spotton, B. and R. Rowley)American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1998, 57(4): 663-690.

Sufana, R. "A Classification of Two Factor Affine Diffusion Term Structure Models," with Christian Gourieroux, Journal of Financial Econometrics, 2006.

Tam, H. “Weak instruments, Degree of Risk Aversion and Equity Premium: Evidence from Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan”Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies , forthcoming (2022) (with L. Lai)

Tam, H. “Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Managing Earnings to Meet Critical Thresholds among Chinese Listed Firms” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting , 48: 3 (2017), pp. 789-818 (with L. Lai)

Tam H. "U-shaped Female Labor Participation with Economic Development: Some Panel Data Evidence” Economic Letters , 110:2 (2011), pp. 140-142

Tam, H. "Explaining the Equity Premium in Hong Kong with C-CAPM: The Use of Emigration Growth as an Instrument” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 19: 3 (2009), pp. 520-533 (with L. Lai).

Tam, H. “Low Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution: Evidence from Mexico,” Journal of the American Academy of Business, 13: 1 (2008), pp. 264-271 (with L. Lai).

Tam, H. “An Economic or Political Kuznets Curve?” Public Choice, 134: 3-4 (2008), pp. 367-389.

Tam H. "Independent Directors and the Propensity to Smooth Income: A Study of Corporate Governance in China,” The Business Review , Cambridge, 7: 1 (2007), pp. 328-335 (with L. Lai).

Tam, H. “The Humean Critique of Lump Sum Taxation,” Public Choice 118: 1-2 (2004), pp. 61-76.

Tam, H. “A Social Contract Approach to the Formation of National Borders,” Public Choice 118: 1-2 (2004), pp. 183-209.