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Revenue Ranking of First-Price Auctions with Resale
Journal of Economic Theory , 145, 5, 2037-2043, 2010
Abstract: When the price setter in post-auction resale is chosen according to exogenous probabilities, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) showed that the first-price auction brings more expected revenues than the second-price auction with truth-bidding bidders. We complete their revenue ranking by proving that the first-price auction produces higher expected revenues the higher the probability the auction winner sets the resale price.
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