Publication Type:
other
Publication Year:
Publication Bibliography:
First-Price Auctions with Resale and with Outcomes Robust to Bid Disclosure
Rand Journal of Economics , 41, 1, 165-178, 2010
Abstract: Although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two-bidder first-price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret, the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed. Nevertheless, we construct a behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure that is equivalent to the pure separating equilibrium under no disclosure. Thus, if the bidders follow this equilibrium, the choice of the disclosure regime does not affect the final allocation of the item nor the expected payoffs.
[go to paper]
Publication Reference Link:
Break down of publication data into fields
Publication Title:
Author Name:
Co-Author Name(s):
c
d
Conference Title:
Report Title:
Title of Paper:
Chapter Title:
Title of Journal:
Title of Book:
Conference Name:
City and Province/State/Country:
Editor's Name (if different from Author's Name):
Volume and Issue:
ISBN/Catalogue No:
Publisher:
City:
Page Number(s):
Publication Type:
Publication Category:
