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Auctions with Almost Homogeneous Bidders
Journal of Economic Theory 144, 3, 1341-1351, 2009
Abstract: We prove that, around the symmetric case, where the values are identically distributed, the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder-specific parameters of the value distributions. We show that the revenue equivalence between the first-price and the second-price auctions to the first-order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem; thereby formally establishing the first-order equivalence Fibich et al. [G. Fibich, A. Gavious, A. Sela, Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions, J. Econ. Theory 115 (2004) 309-321] noticed for their particular perturbation.
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