Publication Type:
journal articles
Publication Year:
2011
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Union-firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency
Games and Economic Behavior , 2011, 71(2), pp.235-245
Abstract: This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union-firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.
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https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825610000746?via%3Dihub
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Union–firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency
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