Kristin Andrews
Professor
York Research Chair in Animal Minds
Office: Ross Building, S420
Phone: (416)736-2100 Ext: 77590
Email: andrewsk@yorku.ca
Primary website: https://kristinandrews.org/
Secondary website: https://kristinandrews.org/
Attached CV
Media Requests Welcome
Accepting New Graduate Students
Kristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Philosophy of Animal Minds, Professor of Philosophy, and member of the Cognitive Science program.
Kristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Animal Minds and Professor of Philosophy at York University, and was elected to the College of the Royal Society of Canada in 2015. She works on issues related to belief and social understanding, the evolution of morality, methodology in animal cognition research, and animal rights. Andrews’s books include Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT 2012) – a defense of her normative and pluralistic theory of folk psychology; The Animal Mind (Routledge 2015; second edition forthcoming 2020) – a survey of how empirical work on animal minds can help to inform debates in the philosophy of mind; and, written with a team of 15 philosophers, Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers Brief (Routledge 2018); The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds (editor with Jacob Beck, Routledge 2018). Andrews has published her theoretical work in numerous journals including The Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Mind and Language, Synthese, Biology and Philosophy, and Southern Journal of Philosophy. Her scientific research on orangutan pantomime communication is published in Biology Letters and Communicative and Integrative Biology. Andrews is co-founder with Lori Gruen and Colin Allen of the Society for Philosophy of Animal Minds (sPAM). In addition to her academic duties, she serves as a member of the Executive Board for The Borneo Orangutan Society Canada, which has the mission to promote conservation of orangutans and their habitat and to educate the public.
Degrees
Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 2000M.A., Philosophy, Western Michigan University, 1995
B.A., Philosophy, Antioch College, 1992
Professional Leadership
-NEH Summer Seminar Director, “Animal Minds and Ethics,” SUNY Potsdam, June-July 2018.
-Co-author of Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief, Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, G.K.D. Crozier,
Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler M. John, L. Syd M Johnson, Robert C. Jones, Will Kymlica, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Peña-Guzmán, Jeff Sebo, Routledge 2018.
-Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant for “Animals and Moral Practice” April 2016
-Organizer, Toronto area Animal Cognition Discussion Group, 2006-present.
Community Contributions
-Support for Nonhuman Rights Project, amicus brief co-author supporting personhood for chimpanzees and elephants.
-Board of Directors, Borneo Orangutan Society, Canada 2008-present.
Research Interests
- University of Minnesota Dissertation Fellowship, academic year 1999-2000. - 1999-2000
- Western Michigan University Research Fellow, academic year 1994-1995. - 1994-95
- Seminar for Advanced Research (with Anne Russon). Funded at $7500. February 2006. - 2006
- National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Faculty Development Seminar: Supranationalism: The Ethics of Global Governance. Participant, Summer 2001. - 2001
- Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship, Summer 1996, to study the French language at the Sorbonne, Paris, France. - 1996 - 1996
- NEH Summer Seminar Director, “Animal Minds and Ethics,” SUNY Potsdam - 2018
- Member of the Royal Society of Canada’s College of New Scholars, Artists and Scientists. - 2015
- Canadian Philosophical Association Biennial Book Prize for Do Apes Read Minds: Toward a New Folk Psychology - 2013
- Western Michigan University Distinguished Alumni Award - 2011
- Visiting Fellow, Center for Agency, Value, and Ethics. Macquarie University - 2015
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant for “Animals and Moral Practice” funded at $97,312 - 2016
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant for “Animals and Philosophy of Mind” funded at $93,723 - 2013
- Social Sciences and Humanities Standard Research Grant recipient for the project “Understanding Folk Psychologies” funded at $49,863.00 - 2005
- York Research Chair in the Philosophy of Animal Minds, York University - 2017
Current Research Projects
-
Summary:
An examination of the nature of normative cognition and the evolution of moral cognition across species.
Description:Moral practice is universal among human cultures, and it isn't uncommon to hear that morality is one thing that makes humans unique on this planet. However, recent scientific research and philosophical investigation have introduced the issue of whether nonhuman animals participate in a moral life as well. My project, "Animals and Moral Practice," will respond to this challenge by examining the diversity of moral practice among human cultures and over human development in order to determine if, and how, different animal species share elements of a moral life with humans. By examining the extent to which other animals may participate in a moral practice, we can gain a better understanding of both human uniqueness and our connection with other animals.
This project will contribute to and advance the current debate in three distinct areas of thought. First, it will pursue a careful analysis of both field and captive research on some nonhuman animal species. I will be focusing on great apes (chimpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, and bonobos), but I also plan to include some discussion of monkeys, cetaceans (whales and dolphins) and elephants, as these species plausibly participate in moral life. I will use my background in the methodology of animal cognition research to investigate carefully claims about social structure, practices, and social norms in great apes and other species. Moving beyond examining a single species, this more comprehensive project will address the evolution of morality across a number of species.
Second, this project will expand the notion of moral practice away from the standard approaches in conversations about animal ethics. Defences of the idea that animals may be participants in a moral community focus on morality as empathy or sympathy. Arguments against this idea focus on the inability of animals to govern themselves by thinking through principles. Moral psychologists and anthropologists, however, are finding that human morality is richer than just autonomy and empathy/sympathy, and my project promises to bring this richness to bear in animal ethics. Moreover, standard approaches have not considered non-western ethical traditions or moral psychology, so I will innovate by encompassing them in my work.
Third, I will respond to philosophical debates about the nature of normativity. Moral practice requires some sense that things ought to be a certain way, and so normativity is a necessary condition for any moral practice. However, it is often thought not to be sufficient. I will interrogate the idea that there is any clear distinction that can be drawn between the moral and the conventional.
The research findings of this project, which will be made public through a book, articles, and postings on a blog "Animal are Us" will be valuable to philosophers of mind, ethicists, and animal cognition researchers, as well as to activists outside of the academic community. My work will assist philosophers in grounding their theories in empirical data by highlighting the diversity of cognitive capacities among species. Ethicists will find that, unlike previous approaches, this project brings together (a) animal research, (b) cross-cultural studies, (c) nonwestern philosophy, and (d) leading philosophical debates about the nature of normativity in order to take seriously the diverse dimensions of morality that we find among human cultures. For animal cognition researchers, my treatment of moral practices will be useful for framing research questions and experimental methodologies. Finally, my findings will be relevant for activists working to end chimpanzee medical testing, seeking legal personhood for some nonhuman animals, or reforming government policy to protect the environments and communities of wild animals.
Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief, Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, G.K.D. Crozier,
Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler M. John, L. Syd M Johnson, Robert C. Jones, Will Kymlica, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Peña-Guzmán, Jeff Sebo, Routledge 2018.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck, eds., Routledge, 2017.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck,
eds., Routledge, 2017.
The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. Routledge, 2015.
Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology MIT Press, 2012.
“Empathy in other apes” with Lori Gruen. Heidi Maibom, ed. Empathy in Morality, Oxford University Press.
“Normative Practices of Other Animals” (forthcoming) Sarah Vincent, Rebecca Ring, and Kristin Andrews In The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, Karen Jones, Mark Timmons and Aaron Zimmerman, eds.
“Do Chimpanzees Reason About Belief?” In Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, 2017.
“Pluralistic Folk Psychology in Humans and Other Animals” In Julian Kiverstein, ed., The Routledge Handbook of the Social Mind, 2017
“It’s Like He’s Thinking or Something”. John Huss, ed. Planet of the Apes and Philosophy. Open Court Books.
“Great Ape Mindreading: What’s at Stake?” Humans and Other Animals: Rethinking the Species Interface. Annette Lanjouw and Raymond Corbey, eds. Cambridge University Press.
"Animal Cognition" With Ljiljana Radenovic. International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette, Sarah Stroud, and John Deigh, eds. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee050
“Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity” With Ljiljana Radenovic. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology, Jennifer Vonk and Todd Shackelford, eds. Oxford University Press, 2012, 39-60.
"Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals" The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds. Oxford University Press, 2011, 469-494.
“Social Knowledge” Keith Jensen, Joan B. Silk, Kristin Andrews, Redouan Bshary, Dorthy L. Cheney, Nathan Emery, Charlotte K. Hemelrijk, Kay Holekamp, Derek C. Penn, Josef Perner, and Christoph Teufel. Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition (Strüngmann Forum Reports). Randolf Menzel and Julia Fischer, eds. MIT Press.
"Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology" Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe eds. New York: Springer, 2007: 191-210.
"Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation" Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: 201-219.
"Why Bush Should Explain September 11th" America's War on Terror. Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson, eds. Ashgate Publishing, 2003: 29-42.
Review of Lurz Mindreading Animals. Notre Dame Philosophical Review. March 30, 2012. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29824-mindreading-animals-the-debate-over-what-animals-know- about-other-minds/
“Are Apes’ Responses to Pointing Gestures Intentional?” with Olivia Sultanescu (first author) Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies Special Issue Pointing: Where Embodied Cognition Meets the Symbolic Mind, 2013 (24): 53-77.
“Pantomime in Great Apes: Evidence and Implications with Anne Russon Communicative and Integrative Biology, 4(3), 315-317.
“Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating the Message” With Anne Russon Biology Letters, published on-line before print August 11, 2010. doi: 10.1098/rsbl.2010.0564
"Politics or Metaphysics? On Attributing Mental Properties to Animals" Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2009: 51-63.
"Telling Stories Without Words" Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16, No. 6-8, 2009: 268-288.
"Telling Tales" Philosophical Psychology Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009: 227-235.
"Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind" Inquiry, Vol. 52, No. 5, 2009: 433-448.
"Animal Cognition" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2008 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/cognition-animal/
"Interpreting the Baboon" Trends in Cognitive Science, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2008: 5-6.
"It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology" Synthese, Vol. 165, No. 1, 2008: 13-29.
"Innovation and the Grain Problem" With Anne Russon and Brian Huss. Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 30, No. 4, 2007: 422.
"Speaking Without Interpreting: A Reply to Bouma on Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation" With Ljiljana Radenovic. Philosophical Psychology Vol. 19, No. 5, 2006: 663-678.
"Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places" Mind and Language 20, No. 5 November 2005: 521–536.
"How to Learn from Our Mistakes: Explanation and Moral Justification" Philosophical Explorations, Volume 7, 2004: 247-264.
"Interpreting Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language" Philosophical Psychology Volume 15, Number 3, 2002: 317-332.
"Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance" Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 7, No. 7, 2000: 12-24.
"The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds" Etica & Animali: The Great Ape Project, August 1996: 131-141.
Commentary on "What Can We Know About What It Is Like to be a Dolphin, and Why It Matters: Dolphin Consciousness and the Ethical Implications" by Thomas White American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting. San Francisco, CA. April 2010
"Explaining Without Language?" University of Cincinatti Conference on Thought and Language. Christopher Gauker, organizer. May 2010.
"Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating on the Message" With Anne Russon. International Primatological Society, Kyoto, Japan, September 2010
"Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating on the Message" With Anne Russon. University of Virginia. Lies We Can Believe In: Fiction, Pretence and Human Nature Workshop. Mitchell Green, Angela Lillard, and Eve Danziger, organizers. March 2010.
"Delusions and Dispositions" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Bloomington IN, June 2009. (Commentary on Maura Tumulty)
"Seeking Folk Psychological Explanations" Washington University PNP colloquium series. October 2009. Queen's University Philosophy colloquium series. January 2010 York University Philosophy colloquium series. March 2010.
"Moral Judgment and Belief Attribution" The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, LA, March 2008.
"Animals as Moral Agents? Studies in Natural Moral Psychology SUNY Potsdam, Philosophy Forum. October 4, 2007.
"Being a 'Natural Psychologist' Without Attributing Beliefs" University of Guelph, Cognitive Science Colloquium Series. January 17, 2007.
"Being a Natural Psychologist Without Attributing Beliefs" The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Atlanta, GA, April 2007.
"Natural Moral Psychologists" College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA. Understanding Other Minds and Moral Agency Conference. Karsten Stueber, organizer. April 19-21, 2007.
"Being a 'Natural Psychologist' Without Attributing Beliefs" McMaster University, Philosophy Colloquium, December 1, 2006.
"Critter Psychology: Folk Psychology Across Species" University of Toronto. UTism 2006: The Cognitive Gap: What is the Fundamental Difference (if any) Between Human and Non-human Intelligence? March 2006.
"Expression and Animal Calls: Reply to Colin Allen, Grant Goodrich, and Andrew Mcaninch" University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Expression: Art, Language, Ethology and Ethics. November 3-5, 2006.
"The Theoretical Entities of Folk Psychology" The Canadian Philosophical Association, Toronto, Canada, May 2006. The Society for Philosophy and Psychology (poster presentation), St. Louis, USA, June 2006. The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2006.
"Critter Psychology" Carleton University Philosophy Colloquium Series, March 1, 2005.
"The Nature of Folk Psychological Prediction" University of Western Ontario Philosophy Colloquium Series October 28, 2005.
"Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places" The Joint Meeting of The Society for Philosophy and Psychology and The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, Spain. July 2004.
"How to Teach Ethics in Global Politics Using Active Learning" International Studies Association, Montreal Canada. March 17, 2004.
"Learning Through Stories" York University Brown Bag Seminar Series, January 2004.
"Explaining Terrorism" The Twenty-first Word Congress of Philosophy, Istanbul, Turkey. August 2003.
"Folk Psychology is Not a Predictive Device" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Pasadena, CA, June 2003. Poster Presentation.
"Folk Psychology is Not Fundamentally a Predictive Device" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Turin, Italy. July 2003
"The Role of Folk Psychology" University of Waterloo Philosophy Colloquium Series. November 7, 2003.
"An Explanation is Not a Justification: Why Bush Needs to Explain September 11" Assessing the Presidency of George W. Bush at Midpoint: Political, Ethical, and Historical Considerations. Conference co-sponsored by the Center for International Politics and Ethics at New England College and University of Southern Mississippi, November 2002.
"Dolphins' Understanding of Modus Ponens: A Test for Mental Representation" North Carolina Philosophical Society/South Carolina Society for Philosophy. Charleston, SC, February 2002.
"How to Learn From Our Mistakes: Explanation and Justification in the Moral Realm" Causation and Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, "How to Learn From Our Mistakes: Explanation and Justification in the Moral Realm" Causation and Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, Belgium, May 2002. , May 2002.
"Anthropomorphism" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Edmonton, AL, June 2002. (Commentary on Brian Keeley)",Anthropomorphism,Andrews
"Psychological Explanations and Moral Justifications" University of Cincinnati Philosophy Colloquium Series, April 2002.
"Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation" The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, April 2001.
"Institutional Moral Development: Will the WTO Ever Grow Up?" Supranationalism: The Ethics of Global Governance NEH seminar, July 2001.
"Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation" Western Michigan University Philosophy Colloquium Series, October 2000.
"Folk Psychological Prediction and Explanation" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Salzburg, Austria, September 2000.
"Animal Minds" University of Minnesota Cognitive Science Center Colloquium, March 1999.
"Prediction, Explanation, and Folk Psychology" (with Peter Verbeek) The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Stanford, CA, June 1999.
"The Changing Criterion for Animal Belief" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Warwick, England, July 1999.
"Does the Chess-playing Computer Have a Theory of Mind?" Poster presentation, Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada, November 6-9, 1998.
"Is False Belief Understanding In Young Children Associated With Naturalistic Peer Interaction?" (with Peter Verbeek) The Fourteenth Bi-Annual Conference of the International Society for Human Ethology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, August 19-23, 1998.
"On Predicting Behavior" The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, Massachusetts, August 1998.
"On Predicting Behavior" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 1998.
"Animal Consciousness: The Intentional Stance and Theory of Mind" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Padua, Italy, August 1997.
"Explaining Terrorism" Proceedings of the Twenty-first World Congress of Philosophy: Philosophical Anthropology. Ankara: The Philosophical Society of Turkey, 2006.
"On Predicting Behavior" The Padeia Project On-Line: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, (1998) http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mind/MindAndr.htm.
"Animal Cognition" International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette, Sarah Stroud, and John Deigh, eds. Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming.
"Beyond Anthropomorphism: Why We Can Attribute Psychological Properties to Animals" Oxford Handbook on Ethics and Animals, Tom Beauchamp & Ray Frey, eds. Oxford University Press.
Kristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Philosophy of Animal Minds, Professor of Philosophy, and member of the Cognitive Science program.
Kristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Animal Minds and Professor of Philosophy at York University, and was elected to the College of the Royal Society of Canada in 2015. She works on issues related to belief and social understanding, the evolution of morality, methodology in animal cognition research, and animal rights. Andrews’s books include Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT 2012) – a defense of her normative and pluralistic theory of folk psychology; The Animal Mind (Routledge 2015; second edition forthcoming 2020) – a survey of how empirical work on animal minds can help to inform debates in the philosophy of mind; and, written with a team of 15 philosophers, Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers Brief (Routledge 2018); The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds (editor with Jacob Beck, Routledge 2018). Andrews has published her theoretical work in numerous journals including The Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Mind and Language, Synthese, Biology and Philosophy, and Southern Journal of Philosophy. Her scientific research on orangutan pantomime communication is published in Biology Letters and Communicative and Integrative Biology. Andrews is co-founder with Lori Gruen and Colin Allen of the Society for Philosophy of Animal Minds (sPAM). In addition to her academic duties, she serves as a member of the Executive Board for The Borneo Orangutan Society Canada, which has the mission to promote conservation of orangutans and their habitat and to educate the public.
Degrees
Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 2000M.A., Philosophy, Western Michigan University, 1995
B.A., Philosophy, Antioch College, 1992
Professional Leadership
-NEH Summer Seminar Director, “Animal Minds and Ethics,” SUNY Potsdam, June-July 2018.
-Co-author of Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief, Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, G.K.D. Crozier,
Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler M. John, L. Syd M Johnson, Robert C. Jones, Will Kymlica, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Peña-Guzmán, Jeff Sebo, Routledge 2018.
-Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant for “Animals and Moral Practice” April 2016
-Organizer, Toronto area Animal Cognition Discussion Group, 2006-present.
Community Contributions
-Support for Nonhuman Rights Project, amicus brief co-author supporting personhood for chimpanzees and elephants.
-Board of Directors, Borneo Orangutan Society, Canada 2008-present.
Research Interests
Awards
- University of Minnesota Dissertation Fellowship, academic year 1999-2000. - 1999-2000
- Western Michigan University Research Fellow, academic year 1994-1995. - 1994-95
- Seminar for Advanced Research (with Anne Russon). Funded at $7500. February 2006. - 2006
- National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Faculty Development Seminar: Supranationalism: The Ethics of Global Governance. Participant, Summer 2001. - 2001
- Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship, Summer 1996, to study the French language at the Sorbonne, Paris, France. - 1996 - 1996
- NEH Summer Seminar Director, “Animal Minds and Ethics,” SUNY Potsdam - 2018
- Member of the Royal Society of Canada’s College of New Scholars, Artists and Scientists. - 2015
- Canadian Philosophical Association Biennial Book Prize for Do Apes Read Minds: Toward a New Folk Psychology - 2013
- Western Michigan University Distinguished Alumni Award - 2011
- Visiting Fellow, Center for Agency, Value, and Ethics. Macquarie University - 2015
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant for “Animals and Moral Practice” funded at $97,312 - 2016
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant for “Animals and Philosophy of Mind” funded at $93,723 - 2013
- Social Sciences and Humanities Standard Research Grant recipient for the project “Understanding Folk Psychologies” funded at $49,863.00 - 2005
- York Research Chair in the Philosophy of Animal Minds, York University - 2017
Current Research Projects
-
Summary:
An examination of the nature of normative cognition and the evolution of moral cognition across species.
Description:Moral practice is universal among human cultures, and it isn't uncommon to hear that morality is one thing that makes humans unique on this planet. However, recent scientific research and philosophical investigation have introduced the issue of whether nonhuman animals participate in a moral life as well. My project, "Animals and Moral Practice," will respond to this challenge by examining the diversity of moral practice among human cultures and over human development in order to determine if, and how, different animal species share elements of a moral life with humans. By examining the extent to which other animals may participate in a moral practice, we can gain a better understanding of both human uniqueness and our connection with other animals.
This project will contribute to and advance the current debate in three distinct areas of thought. First, it will pursue a careful analysis of both field and captive research on some nonhuman animal species. I will be focusing on great apes (chimpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, and bonobos), but I also plan to include some discussion of monkeys, cetaceans (whales and dolphins) and elephants, as these species plausibly participate in moral life. I will use my background in the methodology of animal cognition research to investigate carefully claims about social structure, practices, and social norms in great apes and other species. Moving beyond examining a single species, this more comprehensive project will address the evolution of morality across a number of species.
Second, this project will expand the notion of moral practice away from the standard approaches in conversations about animal ethics. Defences of the idea that animals may be participants in a moral community focus on morality as empathy or sympathy. Arguments against this idea focus on the inability of animals to govern themselves by thinking through principles. Moral psychologists and anthropologists, however, are finding that human morality is richer than just autonomy and empathy/sympathy, and my project promises to bring this richness to bear in animal ethics. Moreover, standard approaches have not considered non-western ethical traditions or moral psychology, so I will innovate by encompassing them in my work.
Third, I will respond to philosophical debates about the nature of normativity. Moral practice requires some sense that things ought to be a certain way, and so normativity is a necessary condition for any moral practice. However, it is often thought not to be sufficient. I will interrogate the idea that there is any clear distinction that can be drawn between the moral and the conventional.
The research findings of this project, which will be made public through a book, articles, and postings on a blog "Animal are Us" will be valuable to philosophers of mind, ethicists, and animal cognition researchers, as well as to activists outside of the academic community. My work will assist philosophers in grounding their theories in empirical data by highlighting the diversity of cognitive capacities among species. Ethicists will find that, unlike previous approaches, this project brings together (a) animal research, (b) cross-cultural studies, (c) nonwestern philosophy, and (d) leading philosophical debates about the nature of normativity in order to take seriously the diverse dimensions of morality that we find among human cultures. For animal cognition researchers, my treatment of moral practices will be useful for framing research questions and experimental methodologies. Finally, my findings will be relevant for activists working to end chimpanzee medical testing, seeking legal personhood for some nonhuman animals, or reforming government policy to protect the environments and communities of wild animals.
Project Type: FundedRole: PI
All Publications
“Empathy in other apes” with Lori Gruen. Heidi Maibom, ed. Empathy in Morality, Oxford University Press.
“Normative Practices of Other Animals” (forthcoming) Sarah Vincent, Rebecca Ring, and Kristin Andrews In The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, Karen Jones, Mark Timmons and Aaron Zimmerman, eds.
“Do Chimpanzees Reason About Belief?” In Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, 2017.
“Pluralistic Folk Psychology in Humans and Other Animals” In Julian Kiverstein, ed., The Routledge Handbook of the Social Mind, 2017
“It’s Like He’s Thinking or Something”. John Huss, ed. Planet of the Apes and Philosophy. Open Court Books.
“Great Ape Mindreading: What’s at Stake?” Humans and Other Animals: Rethinking the Species Interface. Annette Lanjouw and Raymond Corbey, eds. Cambridge University Press.
"Animal Cognition" With Ljiljana Radenovic. International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette, Sarah Stroud, and John Deigh, eds. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee050
“Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity” With Ljiljana Radenovic. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology, Jennifer Vonk and Todd Shackelford, eds. Oxford University Press, 2012, 39-60.
"Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals" The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds. Oxford University Press, 2011, 469-494.
“Social Knowledge” Keith Jensen, Joan B. Silk, Kristin Andrews, Redouan Bshary, Dorthy L. Cheney, Nathan Emery, Charlotte K. Hemelrijk, Kay Holekamp, Derek C. Penn, Josef Perner, and Christoph Teufel. Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition (Strüngmann Forum Reports). Randolf Menzel and Julia Fischer, eds. MIT Press.
"Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology" Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe eds. New York: Springer, 2007: 191-210.
"Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation" Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: 201-219.
"Why Bush Should Explain September 11th" America's War on Terror. Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson, eds. Ashgate Publishing, 2003: 29-42.
Review of Lurz Mindreading Animals. Notre Dame Philosophical Review. March 30, 2012. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29824-mindreading-animals-the-debate-over-what-animals-know- about-other-minds/
Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief, Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, G.K.D. Crozier,
Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler M. John, L. Syd M Johnson, Robert C. Jones, Will Kymlica, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Peña-Guzmán, Jeff Sebo, Routledge 2018.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck, eds., Routledge, 2017.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Animal Minds, Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck,
eds., Routledge, 2017.
The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. Routledge, 2015.
Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology MIT Press, 2012.
“Are Apes’ Responses to Pointing Gestures Intentional?” with Olivia Sultanescu (first author) Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies Special Issue Pointing: Where Embodied Cognition Meets the Symbolic Mind, 2013 (24): 53-77.
“Pantomime in Great Apes: Evidence and Implications with Anne Russon Communicative and Integrative Biology, 4(3), 315-317.
“Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating the Message” With Anne Russon Biology Letters, published on-line before print August 11, 2010. doi: 10.1098/rsbl.2010.0564
"Politics or Metaphysics? On Attributing Mental Properties to Animals" Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2009: 51-63.
"Telling Stories Without Words" Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16, No. 6-8, 2009: 268-288.
"Telling Tales" Philosophical Psychology Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009: 227-235.
"Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind" Inquiry, Vol. 52, No. 5, 2009: 433-448.
"Animal Cognition" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2008 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/cognition-animal/
"Interpreting the Baboon" Trends in Cognitive Science, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2008: 5-6.
"It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology" Synthese, Vol. 165, No. 1, 2008: 13-29.
"Innovation and the Grain Problem" With Anne Russon and Brian Huss. Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 30, No. 4, 2007: 422.
"Speaking Without Interpreting: A Reply to Bouma on Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation" With Ljiljana Radenovic. Philosophical Psychology Vol. 19, No. 5, 2006: 663-678.
"Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places" Mind and Language 20, No. 5 November 2005: 521–536.
"How to Learn from Our Mistakes: Explanation and Moral Justification" Philosophical Explorations, Volume 7, 2004: 247-264.
"Interpreting Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language" Philosophical Psychology Volume 15, Number 3, 2002: 317-332.
"Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance" Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 7, No. 7, 2000: 12-24.
"The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds" Etica & Animali: The Great Ape Project, August 1996: 131-141.
Commentary on "What Can We Know About What It Is Like to be a Dolphin, and Why It Matters: Dolphin Consciousness and the Ethical Implications" by Thomas White American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting. San Francisco, CA. April 2010
"Explaining Without Language?" University of Cincinatti Conference on Thought and Language. Christopher Gauker, organizer. May 2010.
"Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating on the Message" With Anne Russon. International Primatological Society, Kyoto, Japan, September 2010
"Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating on the Message" With Anne Russon. University of Virginia. Lies We Can Believe In: Fiction, Pretence and Human Nature Workshop. Mitchell Green, Angela Lillard, and Eve Danziger, organizers. March 2010.
"Delusions and Dispositions" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Bloomington IN, June 2009. (Commentary on Maura Tumulty)
"Seeking Folk Psychological Explanations" Washington University PNP colloquium series. October 2009. Queen's University Philosophy colloquium series. January 2010 York University Philosophy colloquium series. March 2010.
"Moral Judgment and Belief Attribution" The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, LA, March 2008.
"Animals as Moral Agents? Studies in Natural Moral Psychology SUNY Potsdam, Philosophy Forum. October 4, 2007.
"Being a 'Natural Psychologist' Without Attributing Beliefs" University of Guelph, Cognitive Science Colloquium Series. January 17, 2007.
"Being a Natural Psychologist Without Attributing Beliefs" The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Atlanta, GA, April 2007.
"Natural Moral Psychologists" College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA. Understanding Other Minds and Moral Agency Conference. Karsten Stueber, organizer. April 19-21, 2007.
"Being a 'Natural Psychologist' Without Attributing Beliefs" McMaster University, Philosophy Colloquium, December 1, 2006.
"Critter Psychology: Folk Psychology Across Species" University of Toronto. UTism 2006: The Cognitive Gap: What is the Fundamental Difference (if any) Between Human and Non-human Intelligence? March 2006.
"Expression and Animal Calls: Reply to Colin Allen, Grant Goodrich, and Andrew Mcaninch" University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Expression: Art, Language, Ethology and Ethics. November 3-5, 2006.
"The Theoretical Entities of Folk Psychology" The Canadian Philosophical Association, Toronto, Canada, May 2006. The Society for Philosophy and Psychology (poster presentation), St. Louis, USA, June 2006. The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2006.
"Critter Psychology" Carleton University Philosophy Colloquium Series, March 1, 2005.
"The Nature of Folk Psychological Prediction" University of Western Ontario Philosophy Colloquium Series October 28, 2005.
"Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places" The Joint Meeting of The Society for Philosophy and Psychology and The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, Spain. July 2004.
"How to Teach Ethics in Global Politics Using Active Learning" International Studies Association, Montreal Canada. March 17, 2004.
"Learning Through Stories" York University Brown Bag Seminar Series, January 2004.
"Explaining Terrorism" The Twenty-first Word Congress of Philosophy, Istanbul, Turkey. August 2003.
"Folk Psychology is Not a Predictive Device" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Pasadena, CA, June 2003. Poster Presentation.
"Folk Psychology is Not Fundamentally a Predictive Device" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Turin, Italy. July 2003
"The Role of Folk Psychology" University of Waterloo Philosophy Colloquium Series. November 7, 2003.
"An Explanation is Not a Justification: Why Bush Needs to Explain September 11" Assessing the Presidency of George W. Bush at Midpoint: Political, Ethical, and Historical Considerations. Conference co-sponsored by the Center for International Politics and Ethics at New England College and University of Southern Mississippi, November 2002.
"Dolphins' Understanding of Modus Ponens: A Test for Mental Representation" North Carolina Philosophical Society/South Carolina Society for Philosophy. Charleston, SC, February 2002.
"How to Learn From Our Mistakes: Explanation and Justification in the Moral Realm" Causation and Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, "How to Learn From Our Mistakes: Explanation and Justification in the Moral Realm" Causation and Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, Belgium, May 2002. , May 2002.
"Anthropomorphism" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Edmonton, AL, June 2002. (Commentary on Brian Keeley)",Anthropomorphism,Andrews
"Psychological Explanations and Moral Justifications" University of Cincinnati Philosophy Colloquium Series, April 2002.
"Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation" The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, April 2001.
"Institutional Moral Development: Will the WTO Ever Grow Up?" Supranationalism: The Ethics of Global Governance NEH seminar, July 2001.
"Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation" Western Michigan University Philosophy Colloquium Series, October 2000.
"Folk Psychological Prediction and Explanation" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Salzburg, Austria, September 2000.
"Animal Minds" University of Minnesota Cognitive Science Center Colloquium, March 1999.
"Prediction, Explanation, and Folk Psychology" (with Peter Verbeek) The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Stanford, CA, June 1999.
"The Changing Criterion for Animal Belief" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Warwick, England, July 1999.
"Does the Chess-playing Computer Have a Theory of Mind?" Poster presentation, Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada, November 6-9, 1998.
"Is False Belief Understanding In Young Children Associated With Naturalistic Peer Interaction?" (with Peter Verbeek) The Fourteenth Bi-Annual Conference of the International Society for Human Ethology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, August 19-23, 1998.
"On Predicting Behavior" The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, Massachusetts, August 1998.
"On Predicting Behavior" The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 1998.
"Animal Consciousness: The Intentional Stance and Theory of Mind" The European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Padua, Italy, August 1997.
"Explaining Terrorism" Proceedings of the Twenty-first World Congress of Philosophy: Philosophical Anthropology. Ankara: The Philosophical Society of Turkey, 2006.
"On Predicting Behavior" The Padeia Project On-Line: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, (1998) http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mind/MindAndr.htm.
"Animal Cognition" International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette, Sarah Stroud, and John Deigh, eds. Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming.
"Beyond Anthropomorphism: Why We Can Attribute Psychological Properties to Animals" Oxford Handbook on Ethics and Animals, Tom Beauchamp & Ray Frey, eds. Oxford University Press.
