Shin-Hwan Chiang
Professor
Office: Vari Hall, 1060
Phone: (416) 736-2100 Ext: 77035
Email: schiang@yorku.ca
My research areas are Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics, and International Trade. My recent interests include human capital investment, migration, and the formation of trading blocks.
Coalitions in Oligopoly (with M. Brown), Contributions to Economic Analysis Book Series, Elsevier/North-Holland, September 2003.
Optimum Choice of Invoice Currency with Correlated Exchange Rates” (with M.Anam and G. H. Anjum), Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 2015 (DOI:10.1080/09638199.2015.1010446)
Market Correlation and Property Rights” (with X. Li), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 66, 3, September 2010, 426-438.
Federations, Coalitions, and Risk Diversification” (with Ahmed Saber Mahmud), Public Choice, July 2008. 403-426.
Uncertainty and International Migration: An Option cum Portfolio Model” (with M. Anam and L. Hua), Journal of Labor Research, Sept 2008, 236-250.
Rural Urban Migration of Family Labor: A Portfolio Model” (with M. Anam), The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, Sep2007, Vol. 16, 3, 325-335.
The Structure of Mixed Oligopoly under Uncertainty (with M. Anam and S. Basher) The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, July 2007
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art24/.
Price Discrimination and Social Welfare with Correlated Demand,” (with M. Anam) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, September 2006, 110-122.
Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Products: A Portfolio Approach,” (with M. Anam), Review of International Economics, February 2003, 90-100
Migration, Family and Risk Diversification,” (with K.P. Chen and S.F. Leung), Journal of Labor Economics, March 2003, 353-380.
Unsystematic Risk and Coalition Formation in Product Markets” (with M. Brown) International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 3, February 2002, 313-338.
Export Market Correlation and Strategic Trade Policy,” (with M. Anam ) The Canadian Journal of Economics, 33, 1, February 2000, 41-52.
Personality Attributes and Optimal Hierarchical Compensation Gradients”
(with M. Gort) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 33, January 1998, 227-240.
Dumping with Correlated Demand” (with M. Anam and K. Shrestha)
Southern Economic Journal, 62, April 1996, 1072-1078.
Foreign Investment and the Terms of Technology Transfer,” (with M. Anam),
The Canadian Journal of Economics, 26, 4, November 1993, 976-983.
Why Do Japanese Giant Trading Companies Prefer Foreign Currency to Japanese Yen?” (with C.N. Chen) Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2, 1992, 179-186.
Redundancy Payments and Firm-Specific Training,” Economica, 58, May 1991, 257-259.
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Points in Concave Multi-stage Games"
Games and Economic Behavior (with M. Brown, K. Yamamoto), 3, November 1991, 393-402 (lead article).
General Human Capital As a Shared Investment Under Asymmetric Information,”
The Canadian Journal of Economics (with S.C. Chiang), 23, 1, February 1990, 175-188.
Sharing the Cost of Investment in General Training,” Australian Economic Papers, December 1990, 266-272.
Wage, Productivity and the Firm Specific Human Capital,” Atlantic Economic Journal, 18, 3, September 1990, 82-88.
Patterns of Production and Gains from Trade in a Neo-Ricardian System" (with Winston Chang), Taiwan Economic Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 1989, pp. 459-480.
A Model of Growth and Trade in Time Phased Economies,” (with W. Chang) International Economic Review, 27, 3, September 1986, 783 802.
“A New Class of Sufficient Conditions for the First Order Approach to the Principal Agent Problem,” (with M. Brown, S. Ghosh, E. Wolfstetter), Economics Letters, 21, January 1986, 1 6 (lead article).
“Cost Savings, Wages and the Growth of the Firm,” The Economic Journal, 96, September 1986, 798 807.
Market Correlation and Property Rights
(with X. Li)
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 2010, 166(3), 426-438.
Abstract: This paper examines the origins of property rights in the presence of production uncertainty. Since stealing others' possessions is permitted under anarchy, the winner is able to enjoy the lion's share of total outputs produced by all parties, and this generates a diversification effect, since the random outputs are polled together. Taking this effect into account, we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium for our two-stage game. Specifically, the emergence of property rights is shown to depend on players' incentives to fight, variances, and market correlations. The model predicts that property rights are more likely to emerge when market correlations increase.
[go to paper]
Federations, Coalitions, and Risk Diversification
(with A.S. Mahmud)
Public Choice , 2008, 137(1), 403-426
Abstract: We investigate the optimal size of a nation in the context of a portfolio choice model under uncertainty. With an equal sharing rule, we characterize the equilibrium coalition structure, which is shown to depend on income, risks, and market correlations. Specifically, coalitions are likely to form among regions with similar variance in income and among regions with negative market correlations. The conditions that yield a grand coalition, two sub-coalitions of different sizes, and singletons are derived. Moreover, the equilibrium coalition structures are also examined when geographical contiguity is required.
[go to paper]
Migration, Family and Risk Diversification
(with K.P. Chen and S.F. Leung)
Journal of Labor Economics , 2003, 21(2), 353-380.
Abstract: This article proposes a formal model of migration in which workers are heterogeneous and markets are stochastically correlated. We derive and characterize the optimal migration pattern of a family. We show that migration can take place even when migrants earn less abroad and, surprisingly, when earnings in the foreign country are riskier for every member of the family. Moreover, it may well be an optimal arrangement to have only dependents migrate, thus rationalizing the recent dependent-oriented migration flows from places like Hong Kong and Taiwan. We provide some evidence in support of our theory.
[go to paper]
Unsystematic Risk and Coalition Formation in Product Markets
(with M. Brown)
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,2002, 20(3), 313-338.
Abstract: We study the conjecture that increasing market volatility leads to larger coalitions in an oligopoly. Here, coalition formation decisions are made in a noncooperative game by risk averse firms. They use a sequential offer-counter-offer procedure initiated by Selten and Rubinstein. We find that the conjecture generally fails in a small oligopoly whose firms play a unanimity game, but it is validated in an oligopoly that allows open membership. However, it is valid in a small oligopoly if market volatility is sufficiently high, whatever the rule of membership.
[go to paper]
Uniqueness of Equilibrium for Smooth Multistage Concave Games
(with M. Brown and K. Yamamoto)
Games and Economic Behaviors , 1991, 3(4), 393-402.
Abstract: Smooth, noncooperative, multistage, concave games are formulated so that a new uniqueness condition-based on the Poincaré-Hopf theorem-can be applied. The new condition is the weakest to appear in the uniqueness literature. The uniqueness subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained and examples are given.
[go to paper]
A Model of Growth and Trade in Time-Phased Economies
(with Winston Chang)
International Economic Review , 1986, 27(3), 783 - 802.
Abstract:
[go to paper]
Cost Savings, Wages and the Growth of the Firm
Economic Journal , 1986, 96, 798-807.
Abstract:
[go to paper]
My research areas are Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics, and International Trade. My recent interests include human capital investment, migration, and the formation of trading blocks.
All Publications
Coalitions in Oligopoly (with M. Brown), Contributions to Economic Analysis Book Series, Elsevier/North-Holland, September 2003.
Optimum Choice of Invoice Currency with Correlated Exchange Rates” (with M.Anam and G. H. Anjum), Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 2015 (DOI:10.1080/09638199.2015.1010446)
Market Correlation and Property Rights” (with X. Li), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 66, 3, September 2010, 426-438.
Federations, Coalitions, and Risk Diversification” (with Ahmed Saber Mahmud), Public Choice, July 2008. 403-426.
Uncertainty and International Migration: An Option cum Portfolio Model” (with M. Anam and L. Hua), Journal of Labor Research, Sept 2008, 236-250.
Rural Urban Migration of Family Labor: A Portfolio Model” (with M. Anam), The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, Sep2007, Vol. 16, 3, 325-335.
The Structure of Mixed Oligopoly under Uncertainty (with M. Anam and S. Basher) The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, July 2007
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art24/.
Price Discrimination and Social Welfare with Correlated Demand,” (with M. Anam) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, September 2006, 110-122.
Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Products: A Portfolio Approach,” (with M. Anam), Review of International Economics, February 2003, 90-100
Migration, Family and Risk Diversification,” (with K.P. Chen and S.F. Leung), Journal of Labor Economics, March 2003, 353-380.
Unsystematic Risk and Coalition Formation in Product Markets” (with M. Brown) International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 3, February 2002, 313-338.
Export Market Correlation and Strategic Trade Policy,” (with M. Anam ) The Canadian Journal of Economics, 33, 1, February 2000, 41-52.
Personality Attributes and Optimal Hierarchical Compensation Gradients”
(with M. Gort) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 33, January 1998, 227-240.
Dumping with Correlated Demand” (with M. Anam and K. Shrestha)
Southern Economic Journal, 62, April 1996, 1072-1078.
Foreign Investment and the Terms of Technology Transfer,” (with M. Anam),
The Canadian Journal of Economics, 26, 4, November 1993, 976-983.
Why Do Japanese Giant Trading Companies Prefer Foreign Currency to Japanese Yen?” (with C.N. Chen) Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2, 1992, 179-186.
Redundancy Payments and Firm-Specific Training,” Economica, 58, May 1991, 257-259.
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Points in Concave Multi-stage Games"
Games and Economic Behavior (with M. Brown, K. Yamamoto), 3, November 1991, 393-402 (lead article).
General Human Capital As a Shared Investment Under Asymmetric Information,”
The Canadian Journal of Economics (with S.C. Chiang), 23, 1, February 1990, 175-188.
Sharing the Cost of Investment in General Training,” Australian Economic Papers, December 1990, 266-272.
Wage, Productivity and the Firm Specific Human Capital,” Atlantic Economic Journal, 18, 3, September 1990, 82-88.
Patterns of Production and Gains from Trade in a Neo-Ricardian System" (with Winston Chang), Taiwan Economic Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 1989, pp. 459-480.
A Model of Growth and Trade in Time Phased Economies,” (with W. Chang) International Economic Review, 27, 3, September 1986, 783 802.
“A New Class of Sufficient Conditions for the First Order Approach to the Principal Agent Problem,” (with M. Brown, S. Ghosh, E. Wolfstetter), Economics Letters, 21, January 1986, 1 6 (lead article).
“Cost Savings, Wages and the Growth of the Firm,” The Economic Journal, 96, September 1986, 798 807.
Market Correlation and Property Rights
(with X. Li)
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 2010, 166(3), 426-438.
Abstract: This paper examines the origins of property rights in the presence of production uncertainty. Since stealing others' possessions is permitted under anarchy, the winner is able to enjoy the lion's share of total outputs produced by all parties, and this generates a diversification effect, since the random outputs are polled together. Taking this effect into account, we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium for our two-stage game. Specifically, the emergence of property rights is shown to depend on players' incentives to fight, variances, and market correlations. The model predicts that property rights are more likely to emerge when market correlations increase.
[go to paper]
Federations, Coalitions, and Risk Diversification
(with A.S. Mahmud)
Public Choice , 2008, 137(1), 403-426
Abstract: We investigate the optimal size of a nation in the context of a portfolio choice model under uncertainty. With an equal sharing rule, we characterize the equilibrium coalition structure, which is shown to depend on income, risks, and market correlations. Specifically, coalitions are likely to form among regions with similar variance in income and among regions with negative market correlations. The conditions that yield a grand coalition, two sub-coalitions of different sizes, and singletons are derived. Moreover, the equilibrium coalition structures are also examined when geographical contiguity is required.
[go to paper]
Migration, Family and Risk Diversification
(with K.P. Chen and S.F. Leung)
Journal of Labor Economics , 2003, 21(2), 353-380.
Abstract: This article proposes a formal model of migration in which workers are heterogeneous and markets are stochastically correlated. We derive and characterize the optimal migration pattern of a family. We show that migration can take place even when migrants earn less abroad and, surprisingly, when earnings in the foreign country are riskier for every member of the family. Moreover, it may well be an optimal arrangement to have only dependents migrate, thus rationalizing the recent dependent-oriented migration flows from places like Hong Kong and Taiwan. We provide some evidence in support of our theory.
[go to paper]
Unsystematic Risk and Coalition Formation in Product Markets
(with M. Brown)
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,2002, 20(3), 313-338.
Abstract: We study the conjecture that increasing market volatility leads to larger coalitions in an oligopoly. Here, coalition formation decisions are made in a noncooperative game by risk averse firms. They use a sequential offer-counter-offer procedure initiated by Selten and Rubinstein. We find that the conjecture generally fails in a small oligopoly whose firms play a unanimity game, but it is validated in an oligopoly that allows open membership. However, it is valid in a small oligopoly if market volatility is sufficiently high, whatever the rule of membership.
[go to paper]
Uniqueness of Equilibrium for Smooth Multistage Concave Games
(with M. Brown and K. Yamamoto)
Games and Economic Behaviors , 1991, 3(4), 393-402.
Abstract: Smooth, noncooperative, multistage, concave games are formulated so that a new uniqueness condition-based on the Poincaré-Hopf theorem-can be applied. The new condition is the weakest to appear in the uniqueness literature. The uniqueness subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained and examples are given.
[go to paper]
A Model of Growth and Trade in Time-Phased Economies
(with Winston Chang)
International Economic Review , 1986, 27(3), 783 - 802.
Abstract:
[go to paper]
Cost Savings, Wages and the Growth of the Firm
Economic Journal , 1986, 96, 798-807.
Abstract:
[go to paper]
