Department of Economics
department-of-economics
Kong
Ying
ykong
false
yes
Ying Kong
department-of-economics
Associate Professor
Office: Vari Hall, 1118
Phone: 416-736-2100 Ext: 30101
Email: ykong@yorku.ca
Primary website: http://www.yorku.ca/ykong/
I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at York University. I hold a PhD in Economics from Carleton University. My research interests are in political economy, international finance, international trade, development economics, and program evaluation.
More...
Professor Ying Kong received his PhD in Economics from Carleton University, for his thesis, Prices and Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Market. His research interests are in theoretical and applied microeconomics, industrial organization, international economics and health economics. He has carried out research on price dispersion, dumping and welfare analysis, the competition between brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals, the competition between main airline and low fare carriers, restricting trade policy and ppseudo-generic products and barriers to entry. Most of these researches are conducted through the game theory model. Professor Kong’s research is also extended to economics problem solving using modern mathematical and computing methods. For example, using graph model for conflict resolution to solve multi-player game; using the theory of data simulation to analyze social investors in multi-agent models of financial markets using the theory of cost of living to construct medical care price index. All of Professor Kong’s research can be summarized in the area of price and pricing in imperfectly competitive market. He is the author of numerous articles which are published in: Health Economics, Economics Letters, Review of Industrial Organization, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, The Journal of American Academy of Business (The Business Review), Applied Economics, Pacific Economic Review, Journal of Academy Of Business And Economics, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development etc. Professor Kong also holds the SSRCH (IDR) research grant for “Strategic Analysis on National Pharmacare Program Conflict Using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution” from 2006-2008.In addition; Professor Ying Kong has extensive applied economics, statistics and policy research experience from Statistics Canada, Industrial Canada and Health Canada. He has also been the senior economist in the Science and Technology Ministry and the Education Ministry in China.
Degrees
PhD, Carleton UniversityMPA, School of Public Administration, Carleton University
BSc., Peking University, China
Research Interests
Industrial Organization, Health Economics, International Economics and Business Economics
Current Research Projects
ykong
Strategic Analysis on National Pharmacare Program Conflict Using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
See more
Funders:
RDI (SSHRC)
RDI (SSHRC)
Books
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. The Path of High-tech Industry Development in China (with Weidong Yu and Shuopeng, Deng), Beijing Industry University Press, 1992.
1992
Book Reviews
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. Microeconomics: Principles and Policy, Thomson Nelson, 2007.
2007
Kong, Y. Microeconomics, 4th Canadian edition, by Colander, Richter and Rockerbie, McGraw-Hill, 2006
2006
Kong, Y. Microeconomics, 3rd Canadian edition, by Colander, Richter and Rockerbie, McGraw-Hill, 2005.
2005
Kong, Y. Applied Statistics in Business and Economics, 1st Canadian edition, by Doane, McGraw-Hill, 2005.
2005
Journal Articles
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. "Introducing Social Investors into Multi-Agent Models of Financial Markets” ( with Stephen Chen and Brenda Spotton Visano), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4031, 2006
2006
Kong, Y. “Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets-Reply” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.28, 2006, pp189-193
2006
Kong, Y. "Price Dispersion in a Model of Identical Agents with Perfect Information” (with Dr. Zhiqi Chen), Pacific Economic Review, 9:1, 2004, pp29-44.
2004
Kong, Y. “Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.25, 2004, pp71-86.
2004
Kong, Y. “When Restricting Trade Is Necessary: An Economic Explanation”, The Business Review, Cambridge, 3(1), 2004, pp166-173.
2004
Kong, Y. “Persistent Dumping, Competition and Welfare”, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 12 (1), 2003, pp 19-37.
2003
Kong, Y. “Spinning off Low Cost Carriers-When It Does Make Sense?” (With Dr. Andre Le Dressay), Journal of Academy of Business and Economics, II (2), 2003, pp69-81.
2003
Kong, Y. “Implementation Principles and Macro-management of the Development Plan of High-tech Research in China”, R&D Management, Vol.3, 1991.
1991
Kong, Y. “Rational System of Basic Research –The Role of Universities and Colleges”, R&D Management Vol. 2, 1990.
1990
Kong, Y. “The Core of Technical Progress-The Role of High-tech Industry “(with Zhouying Jin), Quantitative & Technical Economics, Vol.7, 1990.
1990
Kong, Y. “The Development Strategy for China’s Ocean High Technology”, Marine Information, 1990
1990
Kong, Y. “The Optimal Strategy and Policy of Chinese High-tech Industry Development”, China Science and Technology Industries, Vol.7, 1989
1989
Kong, Y. “The Strategy of Multi-aim Education System”, Modern Management Thesis Collection, 1985.
1985
Kong, Y. “The Theory and Application of SQUID (Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices)”, Instrument and Future, Vol.4, 1984.
1984
Conference Papers
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. International Conference on Policy Modeling, June 2006, Hong Kong, China
2008
Kong, Y. International Conference on Business and Information, July 2007, Tokyo, Japan.
2007
Kong, Y. “A Game Theory Model of Welfare Analysis for Price Change of Imports” (with Gervan Fearon), Proceeding of International Conference on Policy Modeling, 2006, Hong Kong, China.
2006
Kong, Y. The 19th International Conference on Industrial, Engineering & Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems (IEA/AIE’06), June, 2006 Annecy, France.
2006
Kong, Y. 40th Canadian Economic Association Conference, May 2006, Montreal, Canada.
2006
Kong, Y. “Competition and Pricing in Pharmaceutical Market”, 4th Global Conference on Business & Economics, 2005, Oxford University, UK.
2005
Kong, Y. 39th Canadian Economic Association Conference, May 2005, Hamilton, Canada
2005
Kong, Y. 1st International Academy of Business and Economics Annual Conference, October 2003, Las Vegas, USA.
2003
Kong, Y. 37th Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 2003, Ottawa, Canada.
2003
Kong, Y. 36th Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference.
2002
Kong, Y. 36th Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 2002, Calgary, Canada.
2002
Kong, Y. 35th Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 2001, Montreal, Canada.
2001
Kong, Y. 35th Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference.
2001
Kong, Y. 8th Southwestern Social Science Association Conference, November 2000, Galveston, Texas, USA.
2000
Kong, Y. 33rd Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 1999, Toronto, Canada.
1999
Kong, Y. Statistics Canada Economic Conference, 1999---Probing the New Economic Realities, August 1999, Ottawa, Canada.
1999
Kong, Y. “The Situation and Development Policy of Chinese High-tech Industry”, The Proceeding of Papers on the Third National Symposium of High Tech Industry Development, 1989.
1989
Conference Proceedings
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. “A Game Theory Model of Inverse Pricing Strategy” (with Hsiao-Chan Wang), Proceeding of International Conference on Business and Information, 2007, Tokyo, Japan.
2007
Kong, Y. “Competition and Pricing in Pharmaceutical Market”, 4th Global Conference on Business & Economics, 2005, Oxford University, UK.
2005
Kong, Y. “ The Competition Strategy in Pharmaceutical Market”, Proceeding of 4th Global Conference on Business & Economics, 2005, Oxford University, UK.
2005
Lu, I. R. R., Thomas, D. R., & Orser, B. J. (2004) . “Latent variable modeling in business research: A comparison of two-step approach with structural equation modeling.” Proceedings of the Annual Conference of Administrative Sciences Association of Canada, Management Science Division,
2004
Kong, Y. “Productivity Measurement and Competitiveness Analysis — The Case of US and Canada”(with David Wallace, Peter Koumanakos), The Proceedings of Statistics Canada Economic Conference 1999 --- Probing the New Economic Realities, 1999, Ottawa, ON,Canada.
1999
Research Reports
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. “Games People Play: The Pricing of Generic Pharmaceuticals” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Business Briefing: PharmaGenerics 2004, pp37-38 World Markets Research Centre, London, UK.
2004
Kong, Y. “Generic Competition Paradox in Pharmaceutical Market”, Business Briefing: PharmaGenerics 2004, pp20-22, World Markets Research Centre, London, UK.
2004
Forthcoming
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. “Can Health Insurance Explain Generic Competition Paradox?”(with Ida Ferrara), Economics Letters (forthcoming), 2008.
2008
Kong, Y. “Competition between Brand-Name and Generics—an Analysis on Pricing of Brand-Name Pharmaceutical”, Health Economics (forthcoming), 2008.
2008
Other
Publication
Year
Competition between Brand-Name and Generics - Analysis on Pricing of Brand-Name Pharmaceutical
Health Economics , 18(5), 2009, pp. 591-606
Abstract: The objective of this paper is to provide two-stage game models explaining the 'Generic Competition Paradox' that demonstrates an increase of brand-name drug price in response to generic entry. Under the assumption that there are two groups of consumers who are segmented by their insurance status, high insurance coverage and low insurance coverage consumers, the models indicate that the decisive factor is the market share of the high insurance coverage consumer and the size of cross-substitute factor relative to certain characteristics of market demand. The paper analyses both the case of only true generic entry and the case of pseudo-generic and true generic entry. The models prove that a brand-name price will increase when both the market share of high insurance coverage consumer and the factor of cross-substitute are small. Also, the 'Generic Competition Paradox' more likely occurs in the market where less pseudo-generic products are produced.
[go to paper]
Health Economics , 18(5), 2009, pp. 591-606
Abstract: The objective of this paper is to provide two-stage game models explaining the 'Generic Competition Paradox' that demonstrates an increase of brand-name drug price in response to generic entry. Under the assumption that there are two groups of consumers who are segmented by their insurance status, high insurance coverage and low insurance coverage consumers, the models indicate that the decisive factor is the market share of the high insurance coverage consumer and the size of cross-substitute factor relative to certain characteristics of market demand. The paper analyses both the case of only true generic entry and the case of pseudo-generic and true generic entry. The models prove that a brand-name price will increase when both the market share of high insurance coverage consumer and the factor of cross-substitute are small. Also, the 'Generic Competition Paradox' more likely occurs in the market where less pseudo-generic products are produced.
[go to paper]
Can Health Insurance Explain Generic Competition Paradox?
(with I. Ferrara)
Economics Letters , 101(1), 2008, pp. 48-52
Abstract: In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.
[go to paper]
(with I. Ferrara)
Economics Letters , 101(1), 2008, pp. 48-52
Abstract: In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.
[go to paper]
Introducing Social Investors into Multi-Agent Models of Financial Markets
(with S. Chen and B. Spotton-Visano)
Advances in Applied Artificial Intelligence: Lecture Notes in Computer Science , 4031, 2006, pp. 109-123
Abstract: Existing models of financial market prices typically assume that investors are informed with economic data and that wealth maximization motivates them. This paper considers the social dimensions of investing and the effect that this additional motivation has on the evolution of prices in a multi-agent model of an equity market. Agents in this model represent both economically informed investors and socially motivated investors who base their decision to invest solely on the popularity of the investment activity itself. The new model captures in a primitive but important way the notion of frenzy associated with speculative manias and panics, and it offers further insight into such anomalies as market bubbles and crashes.
[go to paper]
(with S. Chen and B. Spotton-Visano)
Advances in Applied Artificial Intelligence: Lecture Notes in Computer Science , 4031, 2006, pp. 109-123
Abstract: Existing models of financial market prices typically assume that investors are informed with economic data and that wealth maximization motivates them. This paper considers the social dimensions of investing and the effect that this additional motivation has on the evolution of prices in a multi-agent model of an equity market. Agents in this model represent both economically informed investors and socially motivated investors who base their decision to invest solely on the popularity of the investment activity itself. The new model captures in a primitive but important way the notion of frenzy associated with speculative manias and panics, and it offers further insight into such anomalies as market bubbles and crashes.
[go to paper]
Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets
(with J. Seldon)
Review of Industrial Organization , 25(1), 2004, pp. 71-86
Abstract: This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection. Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs. The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.
[go to paper]
(with J. Seldon)
Review of Industrial Organization , 25(1), 2004, pp. 71-86
Abstract: This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection. Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs. The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.
[go to paper]
Upcoming Courses
| Term | Course Number | Section | Title | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Summer 2025 | AP/ECON3480 3.0 | M | Intro. Statistics for Economists II | LECT |
| Summer 2025 | AP/ECON1540 3.0 | M | Introductory Mathematical Economics II | LECT |
I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at York University. I hold a PhD in Economics from Carleton University. My research interests are in political economy, international finance, international trade, development economics, and program evaluation.
Professor Ying Kong received his PhD in Economics from Carleton University, for his thesis, Prices and Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Market. His research interests are in theoretical and applied microeconomics, industrial organization, international economics and health economics. He has carried out research on price dispersion, dumping and welfare analysis, the competition between brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals, the competition between main airline and low fare carriers, restricting trade policy and ppseudo-generic products and barriers to entry. Most of these researches are conducted through the game theory model. Professor Kong’s research is also extended to economics problem solving using modern mathematical and computing methods. For example, using graph model for conflict resolution to solve multi-player game; using the theory of data simulation to analyze social investors in multi-agent models of financial markets using the theory of cost of living to construct medical care price index. All of Professor Kong’s research can be summarized in the area of price and pricing in imperfectly competitive market. He is the author of numerous articles which are published in: Health Economics, Economics Letters, Review of Industrial Organization, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, The Journal of American Academy of Business (The Business Review), Applied Economics, Pacific Economic Review, Journal of Academy Of Business And Economics, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development etc. Professor Kong also holds the SSRCH (IDR) research grant for “Strategic Analysis on National Pharmacare Program Conflict Using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution” from 2006-2008.In addition; Professor Ying Kong has extensive applied economics, statistics and policy research experience from Statistics Canada, Industrial Canada and Health Canada. He has also been the senior economist in the Science and Technology Ministry and the Education Ministry in China.
Degrees
PhD, Carleton UniversityMPA, School of Public Administration, Carleton University
BSc., Peking University, China
Research Interests
Industrial Organization, Health Economics, International Economics and Business Economics
Current Research Projects
ykong
Strategic Analysis on National Pharmacare Program Conflict Using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
-
Project Type:
Funded
Funders:
RDI (SSHRC)
All Publications
Book Reviews
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. Microeconomics: Principles and Policy, Thomson Nelson, 2007.
2007
Kong, Y. Microeconomics, 4th Canadian edition, by Colander, Richter and Rockerbie, McGraw-Hill, 2006
2006
Kong, Y. Microeconomics, 3rd Canadian edition, by Colander, Richter and Rockerbie, McGraw-Hill, 2005.
2005
Kong, Y. Applied Statistics in Business and Economics, 1st Canadian edition, by Doane, McGraw-Hill, 2005.
2005
Books
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. The Path of High-tech Industry Development in China (with Weidong Yu and Shuopeng, Deng), Beijing Industry University Press, 1992.
1992
Journal Articles
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. "Introducing Social Investors into Multi-Agent Models of Financial Markets” ( with Stephen Chen and Brenda Spotton Visano), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4031, 2006
2006
Kong, Y. “Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets-Reply” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.28, 2006, pp189-193
2006
Kong, Y. "Price Dispersion in a Model of Identical Agents with Perfect Information” (with Dr. Zhiqi Chen), Pacific Economic Review, 9:1, 2004, pp29-44.
2004
Kong, Y. “Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.25, 2004, pp71-86.
2004
Kong, Y. “When Restricting Trade Is Necessary: An Economic Explanation”, The Business Review, Cambridge, 3(1), 2004, pp166-173.
2004
Kong, Y. “Persistent Dumping, Competition and Welfare”, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 12 (1), 2003, pp 19-37.
2003
Kong, Y. “Spinning off Low Cost Carriers-When It Does Make Sense?” (With Dr. Andre Le Dressay), Journal of Academy of Business and Economics, II (2), 2003, pp69-81.
2003
Kong, Y. “Implementation Principles and Macro-management of the Development Plan of High-tech Research in China”, R&D Management, Vol.3, 1991.
1991
Kong, Y. “Rational System of Basic Research –The Role of Universities and Colleges”, R&D Management Vol. 2, 1990.
1990
Kong, Y. “The Core of Technical Progress-The Role of High-tech Industry “(with Zhouying Jin), Quantitative & Technical Economics, Vol.7, 1990.
1990
Kong, Y. “The Development Strategy for China’s Ocean High Technology”, Marine Information, 1990
1990
Kong, Y. “The Optimal Strategy and Policy of Chinese High-tech Industry Development”, China Science and Technology Industries, Vol.7, 1989
1989
Kong, Y. “The Strategy of Multi-aim Education System”, Modern Management Thesis Collection, 1985.
1985
Kong, Y. “The Theory and Application of SQUID (Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices)”, Instrument and Future, Vol.4, 1984.
1984
Conference Papers
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. International Conference on Policy Modeling, June 2006, Hong Kong, China
2008
Kong, Y. International Conference on Business and Information, July 2007, Tokyo, Japan.
2007
Kong, Y. “A Game Theory Model of Welfare Analysis for Price Change of Imports” (with Gervan Fearon), Proceeding of International Conference on Policy Modeling, 2006, Hong Kong, China.
2006
Kong, Y. The 19th International Conference on Industrial, Engineering & Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems (IEA/AIE’06), June, 2006 Annecy, France.
2006
Kong, Y. 40th Canadian Economic Association Conference, May 2006, Montreal, Canada.
2006
Kong, Y. “Competition and Pricing in Pharmaceutical Market”, 4th Global Conference on Business & Economics, 2005, Oxford University, UK.
2005
Kong, Y. 39th Canadian Economic Association Conference, May 2005, Hamilton, Canada
2005
Kong, Y. 1st International Academy of Business and Economics Annual Conference, October 2003, Las Vegas, USA.
2003
Kong, Y. 37th Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 2003, Ottawa, Canada.
2003
Kong, Y. 36th Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference.
2002
Kong, Y. 36th Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 2002, Calgary, Canada.
2002
Kong, Y. 35th Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 2001, Montreal, Canada.
2001
Kong, Y. 35th Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference.
2001
Kong, Y. 8th Southwestern Social Science Association Conference, November 2000, Galveston, Texas, USA.
2000
Kong, Y. 33rd Canadian Economic Association Conference, June 1999, Toronto, Canada.
1999
Kong, Y. Statistics Canada Economic Conference, 1999---Probing the New Economic Realities, August 1999, Ottawa, Canada.
1999
Kong, Y. “The Situation and Development Policy of Chinese High-tech Industry”, The Proceeding of Papers on the Third National Symposium of High Tech Industry Development, 1989.
1989
Conference Proceedings
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. “A Game Theory Model of Inverse Pricing Strategy” (with Hsiao-Chan Wang), Proceeding of International Conference on Business and Information, 2007, Tokyo, Japan.
2007
Kong, Y. “Competition and Pricing in Pharmaceutical Market”, 4th Global Conference on Business & Economics, 2005, Oxford University, UK.
2005
Kong, Y. “ The Competition Strategy in Pharmaceutical Market”, Proceeding of 4th Global Conference on Business & Economics, 2005, Oxford University, UK.
2005
Lu, I. R. R., Thomas, D. R., & Orser, B. J. (2004) . “Latent variable modeling in business research: A comparison of two-step approach with structural equation modeling.” Proceedings of the Annual Conference of Administrative Sciences Association of Canada, Management Science Division,
2004
Kong, Y. “Productivity Measurement and Competitiveness Analysis — The Case of US and Canada”(with David Wallace, Peter Koumanakos), The Proceedings of Statistics Canada Economic Conference 1999 --- Probing the New Economic Realities, 1999, Ottawa, ON,Canada.
1999
Research Reports
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. “Games People Play: The Pricing of Generic Pharmaceuticals” (with Dr. Jim Seldon), Business Briefing: PharmaGenerics 2004, pp37-38 World Markets Research Centre, London, UK.
2004
Kong, Y. “Generic Competition Paradox in Pharmaceutical Market”, Business Briefing: PharmaGenerics 2004, pp20-22, World Markets Research Centre, London, UK.
2004
Forthcoming
Publication
Year
Kong, Y. “Can Health Insurance Explain Generic Competition Paradox?”(with Ida Ferrara), Economics Letters (forthcoming), 2008.
2008
Kong, Y. “Competition between Brand-Name and Generics—an Analysis on Pricing of Brand-Name Pharmaceutical”, Health Economics (forthcoming), 2008.
2008
Other
Publication
Year
Competition between Brand-Name and Generics - Analysis on Pricing of Brand-Name Pharmaceutical
Health Economics , 18(5), 2009, pp. 591-606
Abstract: The objective of this paper is to provide two-stage game models explaining the 'Generic Competition Paradox' that demonstrates an increase of brand-name drug price in response to generic entry. Under the assumption that there are two groups of consumers who are segmented by their insurance status, high insurance coverage and low insurance coverage consumers, the models indicate that the decisive factor is the market share of the high insurance coverage consumer and the size of cross-substitute factor relative to certain characteristics of market demand. The paper analyses both the case of only true generic entry and the case of pseudo-generic and true generic entry. The models prove that a brand-name price will increase when both the market share of high insurance coverage consumer and the factor of cross-substitute are small. Also, the 'Generic Competition Paradox' more likely occurs in the market where less pseudo-generic products are produced.
[go to paper]
Health Economics , 18(5), 2009, pp. 591-606
Abstract: The objective of this paper is to provide two-stage game models explaining the 'Generic Competition Paradox' that demonstrates an increase of brand-name drug price in response to generic entry. Under the assumption that there are two groups of consumers who are segmented by their insurance status, high insurance coverage and low insurance coverage consumers, the models indicate that the decisive factor is the market share of the high insurance coverage consumer and the size of cross-substitute factor relative to certain characteristics of market demand. The paper analyses both the case of only true generic entry and the case of pseudo-generic and true generic entry. The models prove that a brand-name price will increase when both the market share of high insurance coverage consumer and the factor of cross-substitute are small. Also, the 'Generic Competition Paradox' more likely occurs in the market where less pseudo-generic products are produced.
[go to paper]
Can Health Insurance Explain Generic Competition Paradox?
(with I. Ferrara)
Economics Letters , 101(1), 2008, pp. 48-52
Abstract: In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.
[go to paper]
(with I. Ferrara)
Economics Letters , 101(1), 2008, pp. 48-52
Abstract: In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.
[go to paper]
Introducing Social Investors into Multi-Agent Models of Financial Markets
(with S. Chen and B. Spotton-Visano)
Advances in Applied Artificial Intelligence: Lecture Notes in Computer Science , 4031, 2006, pp. 109-123
Abstract: Existing models of financial market prices typically assume that investors are informed with economic data and that wealth maximization motivates them. This paper considers the social dimensions of investing and the effect that this additional motivation has on the evolution of prices in a multi-agent model of an equity market. Agents in this model represent both economically informed investors and socially motivated investors who base their decision to invest solely on the popularity of the investment activity itself. The new model captures in a primitive but important way the notion of frenzy associated with speculative manias and panics, and it offers further insight into such anomalies as market bubbles and crashes.
[go to paper]
(with S. Chen and B. Spotton-Visano)
Advances in Applied Artificial Intelligence: Lecture Notes in Computer Science , 4031, 2006, pp. 109-123
Abstract: Existing models of financial market prices typically assume that investors are informed with economic data and that wealth maximization motivates them. This paper considers the social dimensions of investing and the effect that this additional motivation has on the evolution of prices in a multi-agent model of an equity market. Agents in this model represent both economically informed investors and socially motivated investors who base their decision to invest solely on the popularity of the investment activity itself. The new model captures in a primitive but important way the notion of frenzy associated with speculative manias and panics, and it offers further insight into such anomalies as market bubbles and crashes.
[go to paper]
Pseudo-generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets
(with J. Seldon)
Review of Industrial Organization , 25(1), 2004, pp. 71-86
Abstract: This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection. Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs. The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.
[go to paper]
(with J. Seldon)
Review of Industrial Organization , 25(1), 2004, pp. 71-86
Abstract: This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection. Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs. The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.
[go to paper]
Upcoming Courses
| Term | Course Number | Section | Title | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Summer 2025 | AP/ECON3480 3.0 | M | Intro. Statistics for Economists II | LECT |
| Summer 2025 | AP/ECON1540 3.0 | M | Introductory Mathematical Economics II | LECT |
